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Florida's "Guns-At-Work" Law: Why It Has
Employers Up In Arms and What the
Florida Legislature Should Do About It
ESTHER GLAZER-ESH*
I. INTRODUCTION:
Florida's Preservation and Protection of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms in Motor Vehicles Act of 2008' (the "Guns-At-Work" law or
the "Statute") has Florida employers up in arms. This so-called "Guns-
At-Work" law2 prohibits employers from banning employees from keep-
ing lawfully owned guns locked in employee vehicles while parked in
the employer's parking lot. House Bill 503-creating the "Guns-At-
Work" law'-was signed by Florida Governor Charlie Crist on April 15,
2008, 4 and a mere six days later a challenge to the law was filed5 in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida attempt-
ing to prevent the law from going into effect as scheduled on July 1,
2008.6 In Florida Retail Federation, Inc., v. Attorney General of Florida
("Florida Retail"), the court characterized the "Guns-At-Work" law as
the "first limitation ever adopted in Florida on the right of a private
property owner to prohibit a person who is not a law enforcement officer
from possessing a gun on the property."7 The plaintiffs in the suit
claimed that the law unconstitutionally interferes with private property
rights and that it also conflicts with the standards mandated by the Gen-
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. 2003, Yeshiva University.
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1. FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286
(N.D. Fla. 2008).
3. H.R.B. 503, 110th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2008) (creating FLA. STAT. § 790.251).
4. Cathleen 0. Schoultz, Workplace Violence: New Right to Keep Guns in Cars at Work
Becomes Key Issue for Florida Employers, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REPORTER, May
22, 2008, at 402.
5. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281.
6. Schoultz, supra note 4.
7. 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
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eral Duty Clause8 of the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act
(the "OSH Act").9 In enacting the "Guns-At-Work" law, the Florida
Legislature's stated purpose and intent was to
codify the long-standing legislative policy of the state that individual
citizens have a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, that they
have a constitutional right to possess and keep legally owned firearms
within their motor vehicles for self-defense and other lawful pur-
poses, and that these rights are not abrogated by virtue of becoming a
customer, employee, or invitee of a business entity.'0
When the "Guns-At-Work" law was passed, it also prohibited a busi-
ness, which employs one or more employees who have a permit to carry
a concealed gun, from banning a customer from storing a gun in his
vehicle in the business's parking lot, regardless of whether the customer
possessed a permit to carry a concealed gun. " Due to the unusual draft-
ing in the definition section of the Statute, the "Guns-At-Work" law
would not apply to the customers of a business that does not employ an
employee who possesses a permit for a concealed gun."2 As a result of
this peculiar distinction, the Florida Retail court enjoined the Attorney
General of Florida from enforcing the portions of the "Guns-At-Work"
law that applied to customers.1 3 The court found that the portions of the
law pertaining to customers were unconstitutional because drawing a
distinction between one business and another on the basis of at least one
of the business's employees possessing a permit to carry a concealed gun
is arbitrary and "there is no rational basis for this disparate treatment of
such businesses."' 4 The court found the remainder of the law to be con-
stitutional and denied the issuance of a permanent injunction enjoining
the portions of the law pertaining to employees.' 5 No appeal has been
filed with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
This article discusses the constitutional challenges and strong oppo-
sition to the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law, and the consequences of its
enactment. Although the portions of the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law
relating to employees has withstood the constitutional challenges
brought in the Florida Retail case, this article, nonetheless, advances the
position that the constitutionality of such a law, in an as-applied chal-
lenge, remains suspect. This article discusses how the law severely hin-
8. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
9. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
10. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(3) (2009).
11. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87.
12. Id. at 1287.
13. Id. at 1300.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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ders an employer's ability to comply with the General Duty Clause of
the OSH Act to prevent potential incidents of workplace violence, par-
ticularly within those industries that statistically face a higher risk for an
occurrence of workplace violence. Furthermore, the "Guns-At-Work"
law abrogates an employer's duty of care, which conflicts with the stan-
dards mandated under the General Duty Clause of the OSH Act. For
these reasons, this article argues that in certain instances, the OSH Act
will pre-empt the "Guns-At-Work" law-when the state law conflicts
with the General Duty Clause, leaving an employer unable to simultane-
ously comply with both the federal law and the state law.
The "Guns-At-Work" law also infringes upon a fundamental aspect
of the employer's property interests-the right to exclude. Given the
historical evidence and the tremendous importance of property interests
recognized by the Framers of the Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court, and the State of Florida, such interests should have been
given greater consideration by the Florida Legislature before enacting a
law that forces employers to admit dangerous weapons onto their prop-
erty. Finally, even if the law is able to withstand judicial scrutiny, the
Statute is poorly drafted and shortsighted, leaving many important ques-
tions unanswered. The "Guns-At-Work" law is simply an unwise piece
of legislation that potentially threatens the lives of employees across
Florida, and leaves employers with little means of protecting their
employees from workplace violence, which may result in countless
lawsuits.
This article provides an overview of the "Guns-At-Work" law with
an emphasis on the problematic aspects of the law and advocates for
legislative reform. By pinpointing the problematic aspects of the law,
and advancing possible solutions, the desired effect of this article is for
the Florida Legislature to take heed that the law that it enacted is flawed
and should be reconsidered. Additionally, this article critiques the Flor-
ida Retail court's decision and highlights the flaws in the court's reason-
ing and the weaknesses of the opinion that leave the law open to further
challenges. The Florida Retail court's decision does not foreclose the
possibility that the General Duty Clause is capable of preempting the
"Guns-At-Work" law. Although the law was not enjoined when it was
initially challenged on its face, such a challenge did not involve a fact
specific case, and was not an as-applied challenge. The law, as currently
written, is vulnerable to losing a constitutional challenge once the law is
challenged by an individual employer. The challenge that this article
envisions will occur involves an employer bringing suit after being cited
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") for
failure to prevent or abate a recognized hazard-workplace violence. It
20101
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is within this framework that a court will need to determine if, by fol-
lowing the "Guns-At-Work" law, the employer violated the General
Duty Clause. Additionally, a similar challenge may arise if an employer
fails to comply with the "Guns-At-Work" law and the Attorney General
of Florida brings suit to enforce the law. In either scenario, a court could
very well conclude that the state gun law is preempted if simultaneous
compliance with both the state and federal law is impossible.
Organization of This Article:
Part II of this article discusses the legislative history and the details
of Florida's "Guns-At-Work" law. The article focuses on the portions of
the law that relate to employees, and not to customers, because the por-
tion of the law relating to customers has been struck down. This article
also addresses why the law has been met with so much opposition. Part
III discusses the court's decision in Florida Retail Federation, Inc. v.
Attorney General of Florida,6 which upheld the majority of the Florida
"Guns-At-Work" law. This article critiques the court's decision, particu-
larly as it relates to the General Duty Clause. The court's reasoning pre-
cludes any possibility of the General Duty Clause preempting any state
law. This article disagrees with such a notion, and Part III thus con-
cludes that the General Duty Clause does have preemptive abilities. Part
IV analyzes the potential conflict between the "Guns-At-Work" law and
an employer's obligations under the General Duty Clause. This article
concludes that the General Duty Clause is capable of pre-empting the
"Guns-At-Work" law, and Part IV provides a likely scenario of when
such pre-emption might occur. Part V addresses the argument advanced
by the American Bar Association that property rights are fundamental
and thus any law interfering with such rights should be subjected to the
strict scrutiny standard. Under strict scrutiny, rather than the rational
basis standard used in Florida Retail, the "Guns-At-Work" law likely
would not withstand judicial scrutiny and would be struck down. Part V
also discusses the potentially meritorious elements of such an argument,
but ultimately this article concludes that such an argument is not viable
given existing jurisprudence. Furthermore, the consequences of treating
property rights as fundamental would have tremendous negative effects
on important governmental objectives. Part VI details the various reper-
cussions of the "Guns-At-Work" law and outlines the problematic
aspects of the law. This Part also focuses on the many questions the
poorly drafted Statute has left unanswered, and makes clear that even if
the law is constitutional, it is unwise and ill conceived. Part VII contains
recommendations for amendments to the law that will provide clarity as
16. 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
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well as balance the interests of both sides of this controversy-gun own-
ers and employers.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLORIDA'S
"GUNs-AT-WORK" LAW:
Timing is everything. The Individual Personal Private Protection
Act of 2007,17 a law very similar to the enacted "Guns-At-Work" law,
almost was enacted one year before the "Guns-At-Work" law and would
have prohibited employers from banning employees from storing per-
sonal private property in their cars in a parking lot. 8 According to
Employment Attorney Ed McKenna, under the Individual Personal Pri-
vate Protection Act of 2007, "[a]n employee could have a gun, pornogra-
phy or white supremacy material in the back seat and even if the
materials offend another employee, the employer would [be] prohibited
from taking any action."19 Had it not been for the violent massacre that
occurred on the campus of Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007, where
thirty-two people lost their lives to gun violence, °2 it is likely that the
Individual Personal Private Protection Act of 2007 would have been
enacted. The bill had passed in the Florida Senate on April 10, 2007, but
was defeated in the Florida House on April 18, 2007, a mere two days
after the violent Virginia Tech shooting rampage.2' After the 2007 bill
was defeated, the spokesperson for the National Rifle Association
("NRA") announced to the media that "legislation will be reintroduced
next year."'22 A year later, the NRA was successful in its lobbying
efforts,23 and the Preservation and Protection of the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms in Motor Vehicles Act of 2008 was passed in the Florida
House and the Florida Senate and was signed into law by Governor
Charlie Crist.24
Under the "Guns-At-Work" law, employers may not: prohibit an
employee from possessing a legally owned firearm locked inside his car
in the employer's parking lot;2 5 ask an employee whether he has a gun
17. H.R.B. 1417, 109th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2007).
18. Julia Neyman, House Backs Business Groups on Issue of Guns in Employee Cars, S. FLA.
Bus. J., Apr. 23, 2007, at 12.
19. Id.
20. Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in
U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al.
21. See Neyman, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Letter from Marion P. Hammer, USF Executive Dir., Unified Sportsmen of Fla.,
to USF & NRA Members and Friends (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.nraila.org//
Legislation/Read.aspx?ID=3580.
24. FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (2009) (signed into law).
25. Id. § 790.251(4)(a).
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inside his car in the parking lot;26 search a car in the parking lot for a
gun;27 refuse to allow an employee to enter a parking lot because a gun
is inside his car;28 take any action against an employee based upon state-
ments made by another party concerning possession of a gun inside an
employee's car in the parking lot;29 condition employment on an
employee having or not having a concealed gun permit 30 or on the basis
of an employee agreeing not to store a gun in his car in the parking lot;3
and an employer may not terminate an employee or discriminate against
an employee for possessing a legally owned gun, so long as the gun is
not revealed on company property other than for lawful defense pur-
poses.32 Recognizing the potential danger that guns may pose in the
workplace, and that injuries or death may occur as a result of this law,
the Florida Legislature provided employers with immunity from civil
suits that are "based on actions or inactions taken in compliance with
[the "Guns-At-Work" law]." 3 3 Despite the grant of immunity, the
"Guns-At-Work" law remains controversial and has been met with much
opposition.
Opposition to Florida's "Guns-At-Work" Law:
Providing a safe work environment for employees is of primary
importance to many employers. The "Guns-At-Work" law is viewed by
many employers as a threat to maintaining a safe work environment. 34
Employers fear that the presence of firearms on company property could
increase incidents of workplace violence. Although employers are still
able to prohibit employees from bringing guns inside the workplace, the
fear remains that even having a gun in the company parking lot is too
close for comfort. It is far easier for workplace violence to occur at the
hands of a disgruntled employee who only has to step outside and walk a
short distance to retrieve his stored gun from his car than at the hands of
the same disgruntled employee who has to go home to retrieve that same
weapon. Banning guns from the company parking lot allows for a so-
called "cooling off' period,35 which provides a disgruntled employee
26. Id. § 790.251(4)(b).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 790.251(4)(d).
29. Id. § 790.251(4)(b).
30. Id. § 790.251(4)(c)(1).
31. Id. § 790.251(4)(c)(2).
32. Id. § 790.251(4)(e).
33. Id. § 790.251(5)(b).
34. See, e.g., Schoultz, supra note 4 (quoting Attorney Allan H. Weitzman as saying: "People
are going to get hurt.").
35. See, e.g., Niel D. Perry, Employer Firearm Policies: Parking Lots, State Laws, OSHA,
[Vol. 64:663
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with time to reflect on the situation, rather than act hastily and in the
heat of the moment.
Recent statistics show that these concerns are well-founded. A 2005
study conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that 5.3% of
all business establishments were confronted with an incident of work-
place violence in the prior 12-month period. 36 This amounts to nearly
400,000 incidents of workplace violence. 37 Of the work-related homi-
cides that occurred in 2003, the vast majority were due to gun vio-
lence.38 The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence reports that in
2005, 60% of major employers experienced a disgruntled employee
threatening a member of senior management with violence. 39 Addition-
ally, guns are responsible for a staggering 77% of the homicides that
take place in the workplace.4 ° A recent study shows that a workplace
that does not prohibit guns was almost seven times more likely to expe-
rience a homicide than a workplace that bans guns.4 ' Furthermore,
workplace violence is more prevalent when downsizing or layoffs are
occurring. 42 During times of economic uncertainty, like the current
downward economic situation this country is facing, employers have
even more reason to implement policies banning guns entirely from all
company property.
In light of these statistics, the "Guns-At-Work" law leaves employ-
ers more vulnerable and open to attack by disgruntled employees. This is
true even if all employees have to go through a metal detector before
entering the inside of the workplace because the new law prevents the
employer from searching cars for guns or from asking employees if they
have guns stored in their vehicles. 43 This increases the likelihood that
guns in employee vehicles will go undetected. The Florida Legislature
and the Second Amendment, MONDAQ, July 23, 2008, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=63822.
36. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SURVEY OF WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
PREVENTION tbl. 1, (2005) available at http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osnr0026.pdf.
37. Five-and-three-tenths percent of the 7,361,560 total business establishments constitutes
390,162.68 incidents. See id.
38. "[Sixty-one percent] of female [workplace] homicide victims and 81% of male
[workplace] homicide victims were killed by guns." Anne B. Hoskins, Women Workers,
Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities Among Women,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2005, at 32, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/l0/art4
full.pdf.
39. Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, Guns At Work? An NRA Campaign Threatens
Workplace Safety, http://www.bradycampaign.org/action/workplace/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
40. Id.
41. Dana Loomis et al., Employer Policies Toward Guns and the Risk of Homicide in the
Workplace, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, May 2005, at 830.
42. Eilene Zimmerman, Danger Signals at Work, and How To Handle Them, N.Y. TLmES,
Apr. 15, 2007, at 18.
43. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(b) (2009).
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intended for legally owned guns to go undetected so that lawful gun
owners will not be retaliated against;44 however, an illegally owned gun
or any other dangerous weapon will now be more likely to go undetected
as well. Therefore, as enacted, the law leaves employers with virtually
no power to prevent a violent episode from taking place in the company
parking lot, and at the same time increases the overall likelihood of a
violent occurrence taking place inside the workplace.
Because of the potential for an occurrence of workplace violence,
employers view the "Guns-At-Work" law as a hindrance to their obliga-
tions to maintain a safe workplace under the General Duty Clause of the
OSH Act. The General Duty Clause requires that "[e]ach employer-
shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees. '45
Given the well-known statistics on workplace violence, employers are,
in essence, caught in a catch-22 situation-they recognize that work-
place violence is a hazard likely to cause death or serious harm-and yet
under the "Guns-At-Work" law they are prohibited from completely
banning guns, which cause the vast majority of workplace homicides.
The OSH Act is addressed in greater detail in Parts III and IV of this
article.
The "Guns-At-Work" law has also sparked much opposition
because employers view the law as an infringement of their property
rights.46 The law interferes with an employer's right to exclude
unwanted persons and objects from its property.47 Ironically, the Individ-
ual Personal Private Protection Act of 2007, which failed in the Florida
House a year before the "Guns-At-Work" law was enacted, was intro-
duced as a means of protecting property rights.48 Representative Dennis
Baxley, who sponsored the 2007 bill, explained that he primarily spon-
sored the bill in order to put an end to the practice of employers search-
ing employee vehicles because such a practice "goes over the line by
crossing into private propery. '49 Representative Baxley's remark dem-
onstrates that even those who support "forced-entry" laws5" recognize
44. See, e.g., id. § 790.251(4)(e).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
46. See, e.g., Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla.
2008).
47. See e.g., id.
48. See Neyman, supra note 18.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. The American Bar Association explains that "[t]he legislation is characterized by some as
'forced entry' legislation because it seeks to override the traditional right of a private property
owner to exclude whomever he or she chooses from his or her property and determine the terms
on which others may enter on or use that property." SPECIAL COMM. ON GUN VIOLENCE, Am. BAR
[Vol. 64:663
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the importance of private property and seek to protect such interests.
Another reason for opposition to the "Guns-At-Work" law is that
the law is in essence adding gun owners as a new class of protected
employees.5 An employer may not condition employment upon an
employee possessing a concealed gun license,52 or upon an employee
agreeing not to store a gun in his car.53 Additionally, the employer may
not terminate the employee or discriminate on the basis of the employee
"exercising his or her constitutional right to keep and bear arms or for
exercising the right of self-defense. '54 Adding gun owners as a protected
class trivializes the importance of the other protected classes of employ-
ees.5 5 Furthermore, the "Guns-At-Work" law interferes with "at-will"
employment in Florida. Because Florida is an "at-will" employment
state, generally, an employer may fire an employee for virtually any rea-
son or no reason at all.56 However, the "Guns-At-Work" law strictly
forbids an employer from terminating an employee because he keeps a
lawfully owned gun in his car.57
Not only are employers likely to have the added burden of consult-
ing with legal counsel in order to understand the new law to make sure
they do not violate it, but employers also potentially face costly litiga-
tion. An employer who violates these prohibitions is subject to the
Attorney General of Florida bringing a civil or administrative action
against him.58 In such a case, the employer faces the possibility of pay-
ing damages and civil penalties.59 Additionally, the "Guns-At-Work"
law also provides the aggrieved employee with the right to bring a civil
suit against the employer.6" If the employee's lawsuit is successful, the
employer has to pay the "reasonable personal costs and losses suffered
by the aggrieved person as a result of the violation of rights under this
act."6 1 Lastly, it is quite telling that the Florida Legislature specifically
provides a civil remedy to an aggrieved gun owner, while it specifically
Ass'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/yld/
midyear07/docs/107.pdf.
51. See, e.g., Schoultz, supra note 4.
52. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(c)(1) (2009).
53. Id. § 790.251(4)(c)(2).
54. Id. § 790.251 (4)(e).
55. See, e.g., Schoultz, supra note 4 (quoting Attorney Allan Weitzman as saying: "We're
now equating people having guns with groups protected for their sex, race, or religion.").
56. See, e.g., Walton v. Health Care Dist. of Palm Beach County, 862 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("Under Florida law, if [an employee] is indeed an 'at will' employee, then
he can be terminated for any or no reason.").
57. FLA. STAT. § 790.251 (4)(c)(2)(e).
58. Id. § 790.251(6).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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denies a remedy to an employee who is injured or killed due to the law,
by providing the employer with immunity from civil suits. Perhaps,
therefore, another reason for the opposition is that the "Guns-At-Work"
law places a higher value on the "rights" of a gun owner than a human
life.
III. FLORIDA RETAIL FEDERATION, INC. v. ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF FLORIDA
A constitutional challenge was brought in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking an injunction to pre-
vent the "Guns-At-Work" law from becoming effective.62 The basis of
the challenge was that the law unconstitutionally interferes with private
property rights by violating the Takings Clause63 and the Due Process
Clause.' The plaintiffs also argued that the "Guns-At-Work" law con-
flicts with the standards mandated by the OSH Act.65 Therefore, the
plaintiffs argued that the law is pre-empted by the OSH Act's General
Duty Clause, since employers have a federal obligation to maintain a
workplace free from recognized hazards,66 and the "Guns-At-Work" law
interferes with such obligation.67 Ultimately, the court upheld the major-
ity of the "Guns-At-Work" law.68 The court found that the law as it
relates to employees storing guns in cars in a business's parking lot was
constitutional.69 The court, however, did issue an injunction against the
portion of the law pertaining to customers keeping firearms in a busi-
ness's parking lot.70 No appeal has been filed with the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
In addressing the plaintiffs' argument that the "Guns-At-Work" law
constituted an unconstitutional Taking, the court determined that the
only alteration to the employer's property rights that the "Guns-At-
Work" law creates is if an employer provides parking for its employees,
it may not ban legally owned guns from being stored in employee vehi-
62. Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008).
63. Id. at 1289-90. This article will provide a basic overview of the district court's analysis of
the Takings Clause argument, and critique the court's decision only from a policy perspective, and
not from a constitutional standpoint. For an in depth constitutional analysis on how a similar gun
law should be held unconstitutional under the Takings Clause, see Stefanie L. Steines, Note,
Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault on Private-Property Rights and Workplace Safety, 93 IOWA L.
REV. 1171 (2008).
64. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.
65. Id. at 1297-98.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
67. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
68. See id. at 1300.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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cles.7" However, the law does not force employers to provide parking at
all, and the employer can choose not to do so.72 The court, therefore,
found that no Taking had occurred.7 3 Although the Florida Retail court
suggests that an employer may simply stop providing parking to its
employees entirely to circumvent the "Guns-At-Work" law, such a
response from employers is highly unlikely and impractical. This is
especially true when considering that the law, as enacted, not only
applied to guns in employee cars, but also to guns in customer cars. Not
providing parking to employees may be a severe inconvenience; how-
ever, failing to provide parking for customers would very likely result in
a disastrous financial impact on a business. Therefore, an employer does
not realistically have the choice of simply terminating its practice of
providing parking. The court, however, ultimately determined that the
law does not constitute an unconstitutional Taking because the law
"addresses ... only the storage of guns by individuals who would be on
the property anyway."74
The court then addressed the issue of whether the "Guns-At-Work"
law violates the substantive portion of the Due Process Clause because
"without sufficient justification, the statute compels property owners to
make their property available for purposes they do not support."75 Con-
flicting evidence was presented to the court regarding the "real-world
effect" of the law.76 The plaintiffs contended that having a gun stored in
a car in the parking lot would
invariably increase the risk of an unlawful or accidental shooting with
no offsetting benefit, because ... the gun will be available to an irate
worker who may use it improperly but will never be available to an
honest worker in time to be used defensively to successfully avert a
crime.77
The Attorney General of Florida argued the opposite, insisting that "a
gun in the parking lot will have great benefits in averting crime and will
never lead to the gun's improper use."78 The court eloquently noted that
"[c]ommon sense and human experience suggest the truth lies between
71. Id. at 1289.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1290 ("The guns-at-work statute . . . seeks to make no change in the number of
people using an owner's property, the portions of the property they may use, or their purposes or
activities while there; the statute addresses, instead, only the storage of guns by individuals who
would be on the property anyway.").
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1284.
76. Id. at 1290.
77. Id.
78. Id.
20101
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these extremes."79 Using the rational basis standard of judicial scrutiny,
the court then found that a reasonable legislature could
conclude that allowing workers with concealed-carry permits to keep
guns in business parking lots would have either a small net positive
or small net negative effect on overall public safety. So a state legis-
lature might reasonably choose to give such a worker a right to keep
a gun in a vehicle in the parking lot.80
Therefore, no violation of the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause was found.81
Although common sense may dictate that it is far more likely for
guns in the workplace to increase the risk of violence rather than
decrease the risk to public safety by using such guns for self-defense, in
applying the rational basis level of scrutiny, the safety argument
advanced by the Attorney General of Florida is taken at face value,8" and
thus constitutes a legitimate government purpose and satisfies the
rational basis standard.83 This article, therefore, agrees that the "Guns-
At-Work" law does not violate the Due Process Clause.
Finally, the Florida Retail court also rejected the argument that the
law conflicts with the General Duty Clause of the OSH Act,84 and there-
fore found that the law was not pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution.85 In rejecting the pre-emption claim, the court stated
that it had two independent reasons for doing so.86 First, the court found
that OSHA has not promulgated any standards relating to guns in the
employer's parking lot; therefore, pursuant to section 667(a) of the OSH
Act, 87 a state regulation in this area cannot be preempted by the OSH
Act.88 Second, the court determined that the General Duty Clause simply
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1291.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 923-24 (11 th Cir. 1995) (recognizing the
leniency of the rational basis standard, in favor of the state).
83. See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1320 (N.D. Okla. 2007),
rev'd sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[T]here is no
question that promoting public safety, deterring crime, and protecting the community are
legitimate government purposes.").
84. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
85. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").
86. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006) ("Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or
court from asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this title.").
88. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298 ("Because no standard is in effect ... on guns in
parking lots, [OSHA] does not prevent [the Florida Legislature] from 'asserting jurisdiction under
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does not require that an employer must ban guns from the workplace.8 9
As discussed in the forthcoming analysis, the court's reasoning is
flawed.
A. An Analysis of the Florida Retail Court's First Reason as to Why
the "Guns-At-Work" Law Is Not Preempted by the
General Duty Clause:
The Florida Retail court first emphasized that OSHA has not
promulgated a standard on the specific issue of banning guns in the
workplace, and therefore, the OSH Act "does not prevent a state agency
(this includes the Florida Legislature and the Attorney General) from
'asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or
health issue' relating to guns in parking lots."9 ° In so holding, the court
relied on section 667(a) of the OSH Act which reads: "Nothing in this
chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting jurisdic-
tion under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with
respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this
title."" In essence, the court interpreted section 667(a) as indicating that
the General Duty Clause can never be preemptive. This is because the
General Duty Clause does not constitute a promulgated standard, 92 but
rather, it is a catch-all provision, and therefore, according to the court's
interpretation, in the absence of a promulgated standard, a state occupa-
tional safety and health law can never be preempted by the OSH Act.
The court read section 667(a) of the OSH Act as a "clear statement by
Congress that the OSH Act does not preempt state regulation in this area
[workplace violence]. 93 Interestingly, the court did not expressly say
that the General Duty Clause can never preempt a state regulation; how-
ever, in actuality, this is the implication of the court's holding. However,
the court's reasoning is overbroad and flawed. The court failed to con-
State law over any occupational safety or health issue' relating to guns in parking lots. This is a
clear statement by Congress that the OSH Act does not preempt state regulation in this area."
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006))).
89. Id. at 1298-99 ('The OSH Act is not a general charter for courts to protect worker safety.
The Act instead sets forth explicit standards that courts must enforce. One of those is the general
duty clause .. . .The plaintiffs say this means a business must ban guns from vehicles in the
parking lot. The contention proves way too much. If the failure to ban guns were indeed a
violation of the general duty clause, then all businesses would have a duty to ban guns. One
doubts that even the plaintiffs really assert this is the law .... By enacting the general duty clause,
Congress did not weigh in on this issue." (emphasis added)).
90. Id. at 1298 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 667(a)).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
92. In addition to the General Duty Clause, the OSH Act also requires that an employer
"comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under [the OSH Act]." 29
U.S.C. § 654(a)(2).
93. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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sider the purpose of the General Duty Clause and failed to use relevant
case law on this subject as guidance in its analysis.
1. THE PURPOSE OF THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
The General Duty Clause is distinct from the promulgated stan-
dards in the OSH Act. Using the Florida Retail court's reasoning, not
only would the General Duty Clause not preempt state regulation in the
area of workplace violence, but under such reasoning, the General Duty
Clause could also never preempt any area of state regulation in which a
specific federal standard has not been promulgated. The implications of
this holding are far reaching and go well beyond the scope of the court's
inquiry.
As a way of background, the obligations of the General Duty
Clause are entirely separate from those standards specifically promul-
gated in the OSH Act. The General Duty Clause is an independent man-
date that employers must comply with, in addition to any formal
standards promulgated in the OSH Act. 94 Furthermore, the purpose of
the General Duty Clause is no less important than the purposes behind
the promulgated standards. Therefore, it would make little sense that
promulgated standards would have such strong preemptive effects,
95
whereas the General Duty Clause would not have any preemptive power
at all. As evidence of the importance of the General Duty Clause, the
Senate Report on the OSH Act specifically explains that the General
Duty Clause was enacted because:
The Committee recognizes that precise standards to cover every con-
ceivable situation will not always exist. This legislation would be
seriously deficient if any employee were killed or seriously injured
on the job simply because there was no specific standard applicable
to a recognized hazard which could result in such a misfortune.
Therefore, to cover such circumstances the committee has included a
requirement to the effect that employers are to furnish employment
and places of employment which are free from recognized hazards to
the health and safety of their employees. 9
6
The Senate Report makes clear that the General Duty Clause was
enacted to protect employees from being "killed or seriously injured on
94. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1324 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev'd
sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The 'general duty'
clause is a stand-alone obligation with which employers must comply. It is in addition to the
'specific duty' clause in § 654(a)(2), which requires compliance with the numerous OSH Act
regulations promulgated to prevent specific workplace hazards.").
95. See generally Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that
any state occupational safety law that is regulating in an area in which a federal standard has been
promulgated in the OSH Act is automatically pre-empted).
96. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 5185-86 (1970).
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the job" just as the specific standards are intended to provide such pro-
tection.97 The only difference is that the standards reflect specific situa-
tions that Congress perceived as potentially harmful, whereas, in
enacting the General Duty Clause no specific situation was contem-
plated by Congress. Nonetheless, Congress explicitly stated its intention
to provide the same protection for employees in those situations where a
"recognized hazard" 98 exists in the workplace. 99 Although a state may
be free to regulate in areas in which no standard has been promul-
gated, 00 it is a stretch for the court to assume that this indicates that pre-
emption of such state regulations is never possible.
Furthermore, under the reasoning of the Florida Retail court, the
General Duty Clause could never preempt any state law because there
can never be a clear expression from Congress of its intention to pre-
empt a state law as Congress admittedly did not have any particular
situation in mind.' 01 However, the court failed to understand that this is
precisely the point of the General Duty Clause-to cover all potential
recognized hazards not specifically contemplated by Congress. 10 2 The
General Duty Clause is an important element of the OSH Act and was
intended to be a catch-all provision for those areas in which a specific
standard had not been promulgated, not because it is any less important,
but simply because it is impossible for Congress to contemplate an
exhaustive list of every regulation in the realm of occupational safety
and health.
2. SECTION 667(A)'S PRESERVATION OF STATE JURISDICTION
There is also no precedent for the notion that the General Duty
Clause is not capable of preempting a state law. The Supreme Court has
never specifically ruled on the preemptive effects of the General Duty
Clause. In Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association,10 3
in a plurality decision, the Supreme Court determined that where a spe-
cific federal standard has been promulgated, the OSH Act impliedly
preempts any state regulation in the area of occupational health and
safety even if the state regulation is not conflicting with the standard and
even if the state regulation is stricter and provides additional protection
97. Id. at 5185.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a).
99. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 5185-86.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a).
101. See S. REp. No. 91-1282, at 5185 ("The Committee recognizes that precise standards to
cover every conceivable situation will not always exist. This legislation would be seriously
deficient if any employee were killed or seriously injured on the job simply because there was no
specific standard applicable to a recognized hazard which could result in such a misfortune.").
102. See id. at 5185-86.
103. 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
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to workers.' 4 The controversy in Gade involved two licensing acts
enacted in Illinois, in which the stated purposes were to "'promote job
safety"' and "'to protect life, limb and property,'" respectively.10 5 The
licensing acts constituted "dual impact" statutes, in which the laws were
intended to "protect both workers and the general public."'' 0 6 OSHA had
already promulgated standards for the "protection of employees engaged
in hazardous waste operations," which was the same area in which the
Illinois licensing acts had set regulations.'0 7 The issue presented in Gade
was whether the Illinois "dual impact" statutes were preempted by the
OSH Act because OSHA had already promulgated standards in the area
of hazardous waste operations.1o 8
The Gade Court found that state occupational safety laws that
attempt to regulate in an area in which a federal standard has been
promulgated are impliedly preempted because such laws conflict with
the "full purposes and objectives" of the OSH Act.'019 Only if a state plan
has been submitted to and approved by OSHA, pursuant to section
667(b) of the Act, would a state be able to regulate in an area in which a
standard has been promulgated by OSHA. 110 If no such plan has been
approved, then such a regulation is automatically preempted, and no fur-
ther inquiry is necessary."'I Such is true even for "dual impact" regula-
tions-laws which are not exclusively for the purpose of regulating
occupational health and safety, but rather those laws that serve other
purposes as well." 2 The Gade Court reasoned that section 667(a)'s
"preservation of state authority in the absence of a federal standard pre-
supposes a background preemption of all state occupational safety and
health standards whenever a federal standard governing the same issue is
in effect."' " However, the Gade Court in no way indicated that its anal-
ysis of section 667(a) expressly meant that the General Duty Clause can
never pre-empt a state regulation. There is simply no discussion, nor
104. See id. at 98-99, 102-03 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
105. Id. at 91 (citing Hazardous Waste Crane and Hoisting Equipment Operators Licensing
Act, 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 220/1 to /17 (1989); Hazardous Waste Laborers Licensing Act, 225
ILL. COMP. STAT. 221/1 to /15 (1989)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 92.
108. Id. at 91.
109. Id. at 98-99 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
110. Id. at 102 ("[Tjhe OSH Act precludes any state regulation of an occupational safety or
health issue with respect to which a federal standard has been established, unless a state plan has
been submitted and approved pursuant to [section 667(b)]." (emphasis added)).
11. See id.
112. Id. at 106 (majority opinion) ("Our precedents leave no doubt that a dual impact state
regulation cannot avoid OSH Act pre-emption simply because the regulation serves several
objectives rather than one.").
113. Id. at 100 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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even mention, of the General Duty Clause in the Gade opinion. The
opinion written by Justice O'Connor did seem to acknowledge that sec-
tion 667(a) does "save" a state law in an area in which a federal standard
is not in effect from automatic preemption. 114 This is in contrast to those
areas in which a federal standard has been promulgated, which results in
the automatic preemption of any state regulation in that area, even in the
absence of any actual conflict between the federal and state laws.I15
Although section 667(a) allows for states to regulate where no fed-
eral standard is in effect, it is quite a leap to interpret this as precluding
any possibility of preemption of such a state regulation. Ordinary princi-
ples of preemption should still apply if there is an actual conflict
between federal and state law, where compliance with both is impossi-
ble.' 6 This very principle is precisely what the Supreme Court dis-
cussed in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine.1 7 Sprietsma involved a suit
against Mercury Marine, which had manufactured the motor of the pro-
peller that had killed the petitioner's spouse in a boating accident." 8 The
petitioner contended that the motor was "unreasonably dangerous."' 9
The lower courts had found that the suit was preempted by the Federal
Boat Safety Act, and therefore, dismissed the complaint.12° The
Supreme Court, however, reversed and found that the Federal Boat
Safety Act did not preempt the state common-law tort suit brought by
the petitioner. 2' Despite the fact that the Federal Boat Safety Act con-
tained an express preemption clause, preempting state law in the same
area, the Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that state common-law
tort causes of action were not expressly preempted.12 2 Significantly,
however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "Congress' inclusion of
an express pre-emption clause 'does not bar the ordinary working of
conflict pre-emption principles,' that find implied pre-emption 'where it
114. See id.
115. See id. at 103 ("We cannot accept petitioner's argument that the OSH Act does not pre-
empt nonconflicting state laws.").
116. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 507 (1996) (J. Breyer, concurring)
("Ordinary principles of 'conflict' and 'field' pre-emption .... make clear that a federal
requirement pre-empts a state requirement if (1) the state requirement actually conflicts with the
federal requirement-either because compliance with both is impossible, or because the state
requirement 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress' or (2) the scheme of federal regulation is 'so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."' (citations
omitted)).
117. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
118. Id. at 54-55.
119. Id. at 55.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 70.
122. Id. at 62-64.
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is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements.' "123 District courts have interpreted this statement from
the Supreme Court as indicating that "even when Congress states
expressly what aspects of state law it means to pre-empt, courts must
still infer pre-emption beyond the confines of Congress's statements if
state law actually conflicts with federal law. And this inference is appro-
priate even 'in light of the presumption against pre-emption of state
police power regulations.' 124 The significance of Sprietsma for the pur-
poses of this article is that section 667(a)'s express preservation of state
jurisdiction should not undermine the regular workings of the principles
of preemption, and therefore, implied preemption should still remain
viable in the case of a conflict between state and federal law.
Further support for the proposition that the General Duty Clause is
capable of preempting a state law is demonstrated by the First Circuit's
decision in Puffer's Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan.125 In Puffer's, an
employer was cited by OSHA under the General Duty Clause after an
employee's death was caused by the employer's elevator, which was
found to be a "recognized hazard."1 26 The First Circuit rejected the
employer's contention that because it had complied with the applicable
state law, it could not be found to have violated the General Duty
Clause.' 27 The First Circuit explained that although the state statute
"exempts certain elevators from complying with state regulations, there
is no reason why an employer whose elevator falls within the state
exemption should not comply with the requirements of federal law [the
General Duty Clause]."' 28 The court reasoned that
[t]here is nothing in either the language of the [OSH] Act or its his-
tory that indicates that Congress intended compliance with the mini-
mum standards of applicable state law to create an exemption from
the general duty clause. Absent such evidence, the inescapable con-
clusion is that Congress did not intend state law to create such an
exemption [from the General Duty Clause]. 129
Another district court facing a similar challenge as the one before the
Florida Retail court, has described the Puffer's case as "addressing
whether a state law was preempted by the OSH Act's general duty
123. Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
124. In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678-79 (N.D. Ohio 2005)
(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)).
125. Puffer's Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1984).
126. See id. at 13-14.
127. Id. at 16-17.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 16-17.
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clause."' 30 That district court further explained that the Puffer's court
"first analyzed whether the language of [section] 667(a) functioned to
preempt the state law and then proceeded to analyze whether the state
law 'actually conflicted' with the general duty clause or the overall fed-
eral objectives of the OSH Act."''
The Puffer's court had initially explained the ways in which a state
law can be preempted, writing that:
If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter
in question, state law is still preempted to the extent that it actually
conflicts with federal law, that is when it is impossible to comply
with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. 132
Applying this concept to section 667(a), although Congress has not
"entirely displaced state regulation"'' 33 and has provided the states with
the power to regulate when a federal standard is not in effect; nonethe-
less, ordinary preemption principles should apply, and a state law that is
in actual conflict with the General Duty Clause should still be subject to
preemption.
Significantly, the First Circuit understood that "lt]here is nothing in
either the language of [the OSH] Act or its history that indicates that
Congress intended compliance with the minimum standards of applica-
ble state law to create an exemption from the general duty clause."' 134
Although the Puffer's court ultimately found that the state regulation in
question was not preempted because it did not actually conflict with the
OSH Act; 3 5 nevertheless, the case demonstrates that the General Duty
Clause could have preempted a state law if the two laws were in actual
conflict. In fact, the administrative law judge whose decision had been
appealed, had found that the General Duty Clause did preempt the state
regulation. 36
Consistent with this article's interpretation, the First Circuit under-
stood section 667(a) as preserving state jurisdiction where no federal
standard exists; however, the court nonetheless concluded that:
[T]here is no question that [section 667(a)] was not intended to create
an exemption from the general duty clause for compliance with mini-
130. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1327 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev'd sub
nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. Puffer's, 742 F.2d at 16.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 14-15.
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mum state standards. The language of the statute certainly does not
compel such a result. Indeed, since the state remains free to apply its
standards, it would strain the statutory language to regard enforcing a
federal statute that has more stringent requirements than applicable
state law as preventing the state from asserting jurisdiction. Moreo-
ver, we cannot imagine that Congress would have created such a
major exception from the general duty clause without a single word
in the legislative history indicating that this was its intent. 37
Just as the First Circuit concluded that "compliance with applicable state
law does not create an exemption from the general duty clause,"'' 38 so
too, compliance with the state "Guns-At-Work" law does not mean that
an employer no longer has any obligations under the General Duty
Clause. This article, therefore, argues that because compliance with the
Florida "Guns-At-Work" law could conflict with an employer's obliga-
tions under the General Duty Clause, it is capable of being preempted by
the General Duty Clause. It is in that situation that the obligations under
the General Duty Clause would trump state law.
In sum, a logical interpretation of section 667(a) leads to the con-
clusion that where no standard has been promulgated, the OSH Act
allows states to "assert jurisdiction;"'139 however, that simply means that
in contrast to those areas where a standard is in effect, the state law is
not automatically preempted. However, a state occupational safety law
or even a "dual impact" law 4 ° is still capable of being preempted under
ordinary principles of preemption, if the state law is in actual conflict
with the federal law. Such a conclusion is supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Gade where it wrote: "But under the Supremacy
Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, 'any state law,
however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, which interferes
with or is contrary to federal law, must yield. '""94'
3. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE
THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE FROM PREEMPTING THE
"GUNs-AT-WORK" LAW:
In Gade, Justice Kennedy had concurred with the judgment, but
disagreed with the type of preemption. 142 Whereas the opinion written
by Justice O'Connor classified the case as one of implied preemption,
137. Id. at 17 n.8.
138. Id. at 17.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2006).
140. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 106 (1992) ("Our precedents
leave no doubt that a dual impact state regulation cannot avoid OSH Act pre-emption simply
because the regulation serves several objectives rather than one.").
141. Id. at 108 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 109.
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Justice Kennedy considered it a case of express preemption.' 43 Justice
Kennedy felt more comfortable with an express preemption classifica-
tion because "[a] finding of express pre-emption in this case is not con-
trary to our longstanding rule that we will not infer pre-emption of the
States' historic police powers absent a clear statement of intent by Con-
gress.""' However, the very fact that a plurality of the court was willing
to find preemption under the category of implied pre-emption demon-
strates that the presumption against preemption should not preclude a
finding that the General Duty Clause is capable of preempting the
"Guns-At-Work" law. The presumption against preemption is the notion
that when presented with a preemption challenge, a court will initially
assume that "the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded ... unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress." 14 5 However, the fact that the Gade Court used implied preemp-
tion to preempt areas traditionally regulated by the states-safety and
health " 6-illustrates that even without an explicit statement from Con-
gress, the OSH Act has pre-emptive powers. This conclusion severely
undermines the Florida Retail court's brief analysis of preemption, par-
ticularly as it relates to the OSH Act.
Because a plurality of the Supreme Court found that the standards
promulgated under the OSH Act impliedly preempt all state occupa-
tional safety and health regulations, areas that are traditionally regulated
by the states, the presumption against preemption should not preclude
the General Duty Clause from preempting the "Guns-At-Work" law.
Accordingly, this article argues that despite the Florida Retail court's
decision, the General Duty Clause is capable of preempting a state law,
and thus the "Guns-At-Work" law remains susceptible to further chal-
lenges under the Supremacy Clause. This is true even though safety and
health are areas traditionally regulated by the states. As the Supreme
Court long ago stated: "[A]cts of the State Legislatures . . . though
enacted in the execution of acknowledged State powers, [that] interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress .... must yield." '47 The
Supreme Court also has acknowledged that "[i]t is often a perplexing
question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of
selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the States
143. Id.
144. Id. at 111-12 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
146. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 96. ("Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory
occupational safety and health standards ... and thereby brought the Federal Government into a
field that traditionally had been occupied by the States.").
147. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
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undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide." '14 8 Such
an acknowledgment from the Supreme Court demonstrates that even if
the states are not precluded from enacting regulations, this certainly does
not mean that in the event of an actual conflict between state and federal
law, the state regulation cannot be preempted. Furthermore, other courts
have applied this very concept. The District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio has finely articulated that "even when Congress states
expressly what aspects of state law it means to pre-empt, courts must
still infer pre-emption beyond the confines of Congress's statements if
state law actually conflicts with federal law. And this inference is appro-
priate even 'in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of state
police power regulations.' "149
In conclusion, while safety is traditionally in the realm of state reg-
ulation, the presumption against preemption did not stop the Supreme
Court in Gade from finding that where a federal standard has been
promulgated, the OSH Act preempts all state occupational safety and
health laws, 5 ' including dual impact laws. 15' Thus, the presumption
against preemption should not be a bar to finding that the General Duty
Clause is capable of preempting the "Guns-At-Work" law.
4. UNDER THE OSH ACT, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IS EXCLUSIVE,
WHEREAS STATE JURISDICTION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE:
Finally, the Gade Court enunciated that within the OSH Act, there
is an "assumption of exclusive federal jurisdiction in the absence of an
approved state plan."'' 52 The implications of this statement are clear-
where a federal standard is in effect and a state plan has not been
approved by OSHA, federal jurisdiction is exclusive. Therefore, a state
is not free to implement its own regulations in the same area, even if
such a regulation does not conflict with the federal standard, 153 and even
if the regulation serves another purpose in addition to being an occupa-
tional safety regulation.'54 On the other hand, if there is no promulgated
standard, then the states may regulate in that area; however, this is not to
say that state jurisdiction is exclusive in the sense that a federal law
could never preempt that state regulation in the event of a conflict.
Unlike the assumption of exclusive federal jurisdiction, where a standard
148. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230-31 (emphasis added).
149. In re Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669, 678-79 (N.D. Ohio 2005)
(citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)).
150. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98-99 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
151. See id. at 106 (majority opinion).
152. Id. at 101 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
153. See id. at 98-99, 102-03 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
154. See id. at 106 (majority opinion).
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has been promulgated, the Gade Court did not refer to state jurisdiction
as being exclusive when a federal standard is not in effect. Thus, exclu-
sivity of state jurisdiction should not be read into section 667(a), and
should not be assumed, and thus the application of ordinary principles of
preemption should not be precluded. Accordingly, the "Guns-At-Work"
law should be subject to preemption by the General Duty Clause if the
two laws are in actual conflict with each other.
5. CONCLUSION: DESPITE THE FLORIDA RETAIL COURT'S REASONING,
THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
PREEMPTING A CONFLICTING STATE LAW
Although the Gade Court was not ruling on the issue of preemption
as it relates to the General Duty Clause, the Court certainly did not hold
that the General Duty Clause is not capable of preempting a state law, let
alone a conflicting state law. Unlike the interpretation of the Florida
Retail court,' 55 there is no finding by the Supreme Court that preemption
of a state law by the General Duty Clause is precluded. The implications
of the Florida Retail court's first reason for not finding preemption are
far reaching and would entirely eliminate the possibility that the General
Duty Clause could ever preempt a state law. The General Duty Clause
by definition is intended to cover those areas in which Congress has not
contemplated a precise standard. 56 It is not practical for Congress to
contemplate every single scenario in which a worker's health and safety
could be threatened. In fact, Congress did not attempt to contemplate
every situation, and instead chose to enact the General Duty Clause so
that all employers have a general obligation to provide a workplace "free
from recognized hazards."'157 Under the Florida Retail court's line of
reasoning, because Congress did not promulgate a standard relating to
workplace violence, Congress, therefore, did not make it clear that it
intended for the issue of workplace violence to be covered under the
OSH Act, and the states remain free to "assert jurisdiction."' 58 The Flor-
ida Retail court, therefore, reasoned that the OSH Act cannot preempt
state law in the area of workplace violence. 59 However, the conse-
quence of this interpretation is that the General Duty Clause can never
preempt a state law. There is no precedent for the Florida Retail court's
interpretation because the Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue.
In fact, in Gade, when the Court had the opportunity to explain the
155. See Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298 (N.D. Fla.
2008).
156. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 5185-86 (1970).
157. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
158. Id. § 667(a).
159. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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effects of section 667(a), it did not even mention the General Duty
Clause.
As demonstrated by existing case law, the Florida Retail court was
too dismissive of the notion that the General Duty Clause is capable of
preempting a state law. This article, therefore, contends that the "Guns-
At-Work" law remains vulnerable to being preempted by the General
Duty Clause were the right set of facts present in an as-applied 161 chal-
lenge before a court.
B. An Analysis of the Florida Retail Court's Second Reason as to
Why the "Guns-At-Work" Law is Not Preempted by
the General Duty Clause
The Florida Retail court then addressed the plaintiffs' argument
that the General Duty Clause "means a business must ban guns from
vehicles in the parking lot."' 16 ' The court disposed of this argument by
stating that: "If the failure to ban guns were indeed a violation of the
general duty clause, then all businesses would have a duty to ban
guns."'161 In short, the court found this to be an absurd conclusion, and
therefore, determined that the OSH Act could not possibly require such
action. 163 This article argues that the court tailored the issue too nar-
rowly and in doing so, overlooked the bigger picture. By tailoring the
argument to be that the General Duty Clause mandates that guns must be
banned by employers, the court oversimplifies the issue. The General
Duty Clause mandates that an employer must provide a workplace "free
from recognized hazards."'"6 The appropriate argument is not that guns
must be banned in order to comply with the OSH Act, but rather, in
prohibiting employers from banning guns, employers who do recognize
or should recognize workplace violence to be a hazard in their particular
workplace, are not complying with the OSH Act when completely ignor-
ing a preventative measure that could reduce or eliminate the recognized
hazard. It is a mistake to oversimplify the issue, when in fact, the only
160. See e.g., Tex. Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 n.16 (Tex. 1995)
("[An as-applied challenge is one in which] the plaintiff argues that a statute, even though
generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiffs
particular circumstances.").
161. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1298.
163. With regard to the second reason given for the failure to find pre-emption under the OSH
Act, the Florida Retail court wrote that "[o]ne doubts that even the plaintiffs really assert this [the
failure to ban guns being considered a violation of the general duty clause] is the law." Id. at 1299.
The court's reasoning appears to be conclusory, and is based on the premise that such a conclusion
sounds absurd, and therefore, could not possibly be true. The legal justification for this second
reason is lacking in the opinion. See id. at 1298-99.
164. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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employers who would violate the General Duty Clause by not banning
guns would be those who recognized or should have recognized the haz-
ard of gun violence in their workplace and failed to implement the
appropriate safety measures. As discussed in Part IV of this article, there
are particular industries that are recognized for being at high risk for an
incident of workplace violence. The "Guns-At-Work" law could be
found to conflict with the OSH Act because the "Guns-At-Work" law is
over-inclusive and forces virtually all employers, including those
employers who have recognized workplace violence as a hazard, to
comply, preventing those employers from implementing a crucial
method of abating such a hazard. The court's reasoning may have with-
stood an initial challenge on its face to enjoin the law; however, if an
employer, whose state and federal obligations were in actual conflict
because of the "Guns-At-Work" law, were to bring a challenge, such
reasoning is far too broad and would not survive. Part IV of this article
provides a more thorough analysis of the potential conflict between the
"Guns-At-Work" law and the General Duty Clause.
IV. THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE OF THE OSH ACT IS CAPABLE OF
PREEMPTING FLORIDA'S "GUNS-AT-WORK" LAW: SITUATIONS
IN WHICH A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OSH ACT AND THE
"GUNS-AT-WORK" LAW COULD EXIST:
The OSH Act's stated purpose is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working con-
ditions."' 65 In line with this purpose, every private employer in the
United States is required under the OSH Act's General Duty Clause to
"furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."' 66
Under the General Duty Clause, "a hazard is 'recognized' only when
[OSHA] demonstrates that feasible measures can be taken to reduce
materially the likelihood of death or serious physical harm resulting to
employees." 167
Although OSHA has not promulgated a standard on workplace vio-
lence pursuant to section 655 of the OSH Act;1 68 nonetheless, the agency
has recognized the problem of workplace violence as a potential haz-
ard. 169 In a 1992 OSHA letter of interpretation, the Director of Enforce-
165. Id. § 651(b).
166. Id. § 654(a)(1).
167. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. OSHRC, 622 F.2d 1160, 1164 (2d Cir. 1980).
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 655.
169. See, e.g., OSHA Interpretation Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Directorate of
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ment Programs stated that "[f]ailure of an employer to implement
feasible means of abatement of these hazards [where the risk of violence
is significant enough to constitute a recognized hazard] could result in
the finding of an OSH Act violation."' 7 ° In addition to acknowledging
that workplace violence may be considered a "recognized hazard,"
OSHA has in fact issued citations to employers who have or should have
recognized violence as a hazard, and yet failed to prevent or abate such a
hazard. 7 ' For example, in 1993, Charter Barclay Hospital, a psychiatric
hospital, was issued a citation and fined under the General Duty Clause
for "failing to protect workers from recognized hazards regarding physi-
cal assaults by violent patients.' 72 Not long after Charter Barclay Hos-
pital was cited, OSHA issued a citation to Megawest Financial, Inc. for
violating the General Duty Clause because "security measures were not
taken to minimize or eliminate employee exposure to assault and battery
by tenants of the apartment complex."' 7 3 In the written decision in the
Megawest case, the administrative law judge specifically noted that
"[d]uring the decade of the 1980s, homicide became the third leading
cause of death in the workplace. OSHA understandably seeks an
enforcement role in decreasing these grim statistics."'' 74
Ultimately, however, the administrative law judge in the Megawest
case vacated the citation that was issued because "the hazard was not
recognized by Megawest or by its industry within the meaning of [the
General Duty Clause]."' 75 Nonetheless, the Megawest case demonstrates
that OSHA considers workplace violence to be a potential "recognized
hazard" warranting the issuance of a citation for failure to take necessary
steps to protect employees from this hazard. If an employer recognizes
or should have recognized that workplace violence is a hazard in its
particular establishment or industry, then it may be found to have vio-
lated the General Duty Clause, and faces the possibility of being issued a
citation. 176 Because the threat of assault was not actually recognized by
Megawest or by its industry, the incident did not constitute a "recog-
nized hazard" under the OSH Act, and therefore, the citation was
vacated. 1 77 Thus, the vacating of the citation in the Megawest case does
Enforcement Programs, OSHA, Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-
document?p-jable=INTERPRETATIONS&p-id=25504.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., Megawest Fin., Inc., 1995 OSHARC LEXIS 80 (May 8, 1995).
172. SIERRI L. SCHORNSTEIN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HEALTH CARE: WHAT EVERY
PROFESSIONAL NEEDS To KNow 122 (1997).
173. Megawest, 1995 OSHARC LEXIS 80 at *2.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *32.
176. See id. at *28-29, *32.
177. Id. at *32.
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not undermine the conclusion that it remains possible for OSHA to issue
a citation to an employer who actually does recognize workplace vio-
lence as a potential hazard in its establishment or within its industry.
Employers within industries that are recognized for high rates of
work-related violence are particularly at risk for a citation if they fail to
take appropriate measures to protect their employees from the recog-
nized hazard. Unlike the Megawest case, the statistics for workplace vio-
lence in these high-risk-of-violence industries are known, and therefore,
the hazard is likely to be considered as "recognized." For example, the
health care and social service industries have an especially high rate of
workplace violence, 78 and therefore, an employer within these indus-
tries is more likely to be found to have violated the General Duty Clause
for a workplace violence incident than is an employer in a statistically
safer industry. In fact, OSHA has explicitly recognized that these indus-
tries are particularly at risk for an incident of workplace violence, and
therefore, has specifically issued guidelines for preventing such violence
in these high-risk industries.' 79 In issuing the Guidelines for Preventing
Workplace Violence for Health Care & Social Service Workers, OSHA
specifically provided in the notice section that "[f]ailure to implement
these guidelines is not in itself a violation of the General Duty Clause.
However, employers can be cited for violating the General Duty Clause
if there is a recognized hazard of workplace violence in their establish-
ments and they do nothing to prevent or abate it."'80 Significantly,
an employer's statutory responsibility for a hazard [does not] van-
ish[ ], [nor is it] even diminished, because the hazard was directly
caused by an employee. The [OSH] Act provides "that employers and
employees have separate but dependent responsibilities and rights
with respect to achieving safe and healthful working conditions." An
employer has a duty to prevent and suppress hazardous conduct by
employees. 18'
The fact that OSHA has issued citations for workplace violence
indicates that such violence is an area that OSHA considers as part of its
regulatory authority. Furthermore, OSHA's issuance of guidelines to
prevent workplace violence is further evidence that this is an area that
OSHA is watching and is regulating. For example, in 2004, OSHA
178. See OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PUB. No. 3148-01R, GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTING
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE FOR HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL SERVICES WORKERS (2004), available at
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3148.pdf.
179. See id. at 5 ("For many years, health care and social service workers have faced a
significant risk of job-related violence. Assaults represent a serious safety and health hazard
within these industries.").
180. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
181. Nat'l Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2) (2006)).
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issued a citation to KSC Services pursuant to the General Duty Clause
on the grounds that the "employer had not developed and implemented
measures to protect workers from assault or other forms of physical vio-
lence in the workplace."' 82 The citation further stated that "[t]his hazard
is recognized by the employer and by the industry."' 8 3 Another example
of OSHA using the General Duty Clause to enforce the OSH Act
occurred in 2008 when it issued a citation to a 7-Eleven convenience
store for the very same reason it issued the KSC Services citation-
workplace violence.'84
Consequently, the "Guns-At-Work" law makes employers in high-
risk industries particularly vulnerable to citations for violating the Gen-
eral Duty Clause. Knowing the high statistics of workplace violence in
their industry and that an employee may very well have a gun in his
nearby vehicle, creates a dangerous work environment that the employer
recognizes or should recognize as a hazard. In addition to those individ-
ual employers who have actually recognized a particular hazard in their
workplace, Florida employers in industries that are recognized for being
at high risk for a violent incident are also susceptible to an OSHA cita-
tion. Yet, under the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law, the employer is pro-
hibited from taking the necessary security measures to eliminate or
reduce the harm. The employer is forbidden from completely banning
guns from its property.' By not being allowed to ascertain which
employees keep a gun in vehicles in the parking lot,'86 and therefore,
pose a threat of gun violence in the workplace, the employer is further
restricted from implementing many other useful methods of preventing
workplace violence.
Regardless of the industry, warning signals do exist as to which
individuals are more likely to be perpetrators of workplace violence. The
United States Office of Personnel Management includes "bringing a
weapon to the workplace, brandishing a weapon in the workplace, mak-
ing inappropriate references to guns, or fascination with weapons" as
potential indicators of individuals more likely to perpetrate workplace
violence. 87 However, with the "Guns-At-Work" law, even if an
employee talks about guns, or about owning a gun, an employer is pro-
182. Citation KSC Services, Inc., No. 01001 (OSHA Sept. 7, 2004).
183. Id.
184. Citation 7-Eleven, Inc. #20638, No. 01001 (OSHA May 1, 2008).
185. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a) (2009).
186. Id. § 790.251 (4)(b).
187. OFFICE OF WORKFORCE RELATIONS, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., PuB. No. OWR-09,
DEALING WITH WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: A GUIDE TO AGENCY PLANNERS 17 (1998), available at
http://opm.gov/EmploymentandBenefits/WorkLife/0ficialDocuments/handbooksguides[Work
placeViolence/full.pdf.
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hibited from taking any action against the employee.1 88 The law appears
to mandate that the employer simply ignore such alarming warning signs
and may not make any further inquiry. At least one employment attorney
suggests that in situations where an employee reports to the employer
that another employee threatened him or her with a gun, it is best for the
employer to contact the police, rather than risk violating the law.'8 9
However, calling the police appears to be a drastic measure in situations
where a simple inquiry might suffice, and may perhaps clear up any
misunderstandings. However, under the law, the employer may not con-
front the employee, 9 ' and is left with no other choice than to call law
enforcement. Involving law enforcement may create an atmosphere of
general uneasiness and anxiety among employees and may lead employ-
ees to question the safety of the workplace. This is particularly true
when repeat calls to law enforcement may occur. An even worse conse-
quence of waiting for the police to intervene is that by the time the
police arrive, it may be too late to prevent the violence.
Implementing a workplace-safety program, such as a ban on fire-
arms, not only leads to a safer work environment, but also reduces the
likelihood of an employer being issued a citation from OSHA. 1 ' If an
employer has a violence-prevention plan in place in order to abate the
recognized hazard of workplace violence, then the burden is on OSHA
to demonstrate the inadequacy of such a plan. 192 However, the "Guns-
At-Work" law interferes with an employer's ability to defend itself
against an OSHA citation. Employers are not allowed to implement a
safety program to the level necessary to reduce or eliminate the recog-
nized hazard of workplace violence by banning guns from all company
property. If the employer had appropriate safety measures in place, then
OSHA has the burden of showing such precautions were inadequate.
193
Instead, employers are left exposed to OSHA citations if workplace vio-
lence is a recognized hazard, when banning guns from all company
188. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(b).
189. Yesenia Salcedo, Business Groups Challenge Florida "Guns at Work" Law, INSIDE
COUNS. MAG., July 1, 2008, at 73.
190. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(b).
191. See Nat'l Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("Because employers have a general duty to do virtually everything possible to prevent and
repress hazardous conduct by employees, violations exist almost everywhere, and the Secretary
has an awesomely broad discretion in selecting defendants and in proposing penalties. To assure
that citations issue only upon careful deliberation, the Secretary must be constrained to specify the
particular steps a cited employer should have taken to avoid citation, and to demonstrate the
feasibility and likely utility of those measures." (emphasis added)).
192. See Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637, 640 (5th Cir. 1979) ("It is
[OSHA's] burden to show that demonstrably feasible measures would materially reduce the
likelihood that such injury as that which resulted from the cited hazard would have occurred.").
193. See Nat'l Realty, 489 F.2d at 1263, 1265.
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property is a feasible measure, drastically reducing the occurrence of
workplace violence. ' Additionally, if an employer is issued a citation,
OSHA requires that the employer take action to abate the hazard that
resulted in a violation of the General Duty Clause.'95 In such a case, the
Florida "Guns-At-Work" law stands as a direct obstacle to the employer
implementing the best method available for reducing and abating 96 the
hazard-completely banning guns from all company property, 9 '
because it strictly forbids such a ban. 98
Additionally, although difficult to construe the full meaning of the
provision, the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law specifically provides that
employers have "no duty of care related to the actions prohibited under
[the "Guns-At-Work" law]."' 199 Abrogating an employer's duty of care
to protect employees from recognized hazards is directly in conflict with
the mandates of the General Duty Clause.200 In striking down a similar
Oklahoma gun law, the court in ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, found that
such a law conflicts with the purpose of the OSH Act, which Congress
specifically intended for employers to actively provide a safe work-
place.2°' Similarly, in abrogating an employer's duty of care, the Florida
"Guns-At-Work" law is circumventing a primary objective of the OSH
Act. Not only is it extremely dangerous for the Florida Legislature to
require that employers turn a blind eye to potential violence, but it also
appears to be a violation of the OSH Act. The "Guns-At-Work" law also
specifically prohibits an employer from taking action against an
employee "based upon verbal or written statements of any party con-
cerning possession of a firearm stored inside a private motor vehicle in a
194. See, e.g., Champlin Petroleum, 593 F.2d at 640 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 530 F.2d
1143, 1145 (5th Cir. 1976)) ("[The General Duty Clause] requires the employer to eliminate only
'feasibly preventable' hazards.").
195. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (2006) ("[A citation issued by OSHA] shall fix a reasonable time for
the abatement of the violation" (emphasis added)).
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., DANA LOOMIS, PREVENTING GUN VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (2008),
available at http://www.asisonline.org/foundation/guns.pdf ("[A] comprehensive, written policy
prohibiting weapons in the workplace is an essential part of an employer's violence-prevention
plan. Research suggests that workplaces that prohibit weapons are significantly less likely to
experience a worker homicide than workplaces that allow guns.").
198. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(a) (2009).
199. Id. § 790.251(5)(a) (emphasis added).
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
201. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1338 (N.D. Okla. 2007) ("[The
Oklahoma gun laws] 'thwart' the overarching federal policies of 'encouraging employers and
employees in their efforts to reduce the number of occupational safety and health hazards' and
'stimulat[ing] employers and employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs for
providing safe and healthful working conditions.'" (citations omitted)), rev'd sub nom. Ramsey
Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
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parking lot for lawful purposes. °2 0 2 If an employee informs the
employer that another employee is brandishing a firearm inside his car,
is the employer prohibited from taking action? Is the employer required
to simply ignore such a report? Being specifically informed about such a
threat would logically transform a hazard into a "recognized" one for
purposes of the General Duty Clause.20 3 In that situation, not taking
action could constitute a violation of the OSH Act.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has recognized that: "Often Con-
gress does not clearly state in its legislation whether it intends to pre-
empt state laws; and in such instances, the courts normally sustain local
regulation of the same subject matter unless it conflicts with federal law
or would frustrate the federal scheme. '2 4 Because an employer, who
does recognize or should recognize workplace violence as a hazard in its
workplace or industry, has an obligation under the OSH Act to minimize
such a hazard, the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law potentially stands in
direct conflict with the standards mandated by the General Duty Clause.
Therefore, in such situations, the state law "must yield" to the federal
law.205 Additionally, if an OSHA citation is issued, being unable to take
the required steps to abate the hazard, which is required by the OSH Act,
makes the employer's ability to comply with the federal law impossi-
ble.20 6 Finally, abrogating the employer's duty of care is contrary to the
OSH Act, which puts the burden on employers to provide a workplace
free from recognized hazards, 2 7 and attempts to hold employers
accountable for failing to do so.208 The Florida Retail court was not
conducting a fact-specific inquiry, because the law was only challenged
on its face. Because the mandates of the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law
create situations where simultaneous compliance with federal law is
impossible, the "Guns-At-Work" law "must yield"2 9 in such situations.
For all of these reasons, this article argues that there are situations in
which the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law stands in conflict with the OSH
Act, and in such situations, simultaneous compliance with both laws is
impossible. It is in those situations where the General Duty Clause of the
OSH Act could pre-empt the "Guns-At-Work" law.
202. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(b).
203. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1).
204. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978).
205. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a).
207. See id. § 654(a)(1).
208. See id. § 658(a).
209. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 108.
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V. PROPERTY RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?:
THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERTY
In noticing a developing trend of heavy lobbying for "Guns-At-
Work" laws, 210 the American Bar Association ("ABA") submitted a
report to its House of Delegates with its recommendation relating to this
recent wave of "forced entry" '' legislation. The ABA advocates the
position that the right to exclude is a fundamental property right,212 and
therefore, a "forced entry" law such as the "Guns-At-Work" law should
be subjected to strict scrutiny,21 3 requiring a compelling government
purpose and that the law is narrowly tailored. This is in contrast to the
rational basis standard employed by the Florida Retail court, which
requires only a legitimate government purpose in order to uphold the
law. 214 However, it is very likely that the result would have been differ-
ent had the court subjected the law to a heightened level of scrutiny. As
explained by the Florida Supreme Court: "In a strict scrutiny analysis,
legislative conclusions are not taken at face value.1215 The so-called
conceivable legitimate purpose-that having a gun in a car could actu-
ally be safer in the event it is needed for self defense2 6-would no
longer be taken at face value, and a court may question such a conclu-
sion. Given all of the workplace violence statistics drawing the opposite
conclusion,217 having guns in the workplace for safety and security pur-
poses is certainly a questionable reason and falls quite short of constitut-
ing a compelling government purpose.
In fact, in ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, a case involving a similar
gun law in Oklahoma, the court conceded that should the gun law be
subjected to strict scrutiny, it would not pass constitutional muster.2 1,8
The ConocoPhillips court specifically noted that the law compels
employers to "allow potentially dangerous weapons on their private
210. See, e.g., Schoultz supra note 4 ("[The NRA] took up the cause of guns in parking lots
after a 2002 incident in Oklahoma in which workers were fired for having guns in the trunks of
their vehicles parked at work.").
211. As explained in the ABA's report, "The legislation is characterized by some as 'forced
entry' legislation because it seeks to override the traditional right of a private property owner to
exclude whomever he or she chooses from his or her property and determine the terms on which
others may enter on or use that property." See SPECIAL COMM. ON GuN VIOLENCE, supra note 50,
at 2.
212. Id. at 4.
213. Id. at 5.
214. Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (N.D. Fla.
2008).
215. Haire v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Serv., 870 So. 2d 774, 782 (Fla. 2004).
216. See Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
217. See, e.g., Loomis et al., supra note 41.
218. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1321 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev'd sub
nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
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property in order to increase public safety and deter crime. As a matter
of common sense .... an increased number of firearms in vehicles on
private property would logically lead to an overall decrease in public
safety. '2'9 The court further conceded that should the law be subjected
to strict scrutiny, the law would fail such analysis because it is "not
tailored to achieve [the] objectives of promoting safety of Oklahoma
citizens. 220
Regardless of these concessions, the ConocoPhillips court appro-
priately subjected the law to the rational basis level of scrutiny. 221 The
plaintiffs in ConocoPhillips had submitted the ABA report to the
ConocoPhillips court in support of their case.222 The court concluded
that the report "merely discusses the importance of the right to exclude
within an analysis under the Takings Clause and does not support the
proposition that regulations of property rights are subject to heightened
review under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. 212 3
Therefore, the ConocoPhillips court did not apply strict scrutiny. 224 The
Florida Retail and ConocoPhillips courts were correct in applying only
the rational basis standard, as existing jurisprudence has never recog-
nized that property rights are fundamental rights that should trigger a
strict scrutiny analysis. Perhaps the difficulty of advocating that property
rights should be considered fundamental explains why the plaintiffs in
ConocoPhillips failed to adequately follow through with this argument
in the Appellate Brief they submitted to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Rather than furthering the ABA's argument that such gun laws
should be subjected to strict scrutiny,225 the plaintiffs instead contended
that the law should fail under any level of scrutiny because the law lacks
even a rational basis.226 However, the rational basis standard is highly
deferential to the state, and not even meeting minimal rationality would
be an exceptional finding.227 Thus, it is of no surprise that such an argu-
ment did not succeed on appeal.22 8
Furthermore, applying a strict level of scrutiny to property rights
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1322.
221. See id. at 1319.
222. See id. at 1286 n.4.
223. Id. at 1319 n.46.
224. Id.
225. See SPECIAL COMM. ON GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 50, at 5.
226. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee at 41-43, ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (No. 07-
5166).
227. The rational basis standard is highly deferential to the state. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach
Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) ("[T]hose attacking the rationality of the [legislation]
have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which might support it."' (citing
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973))).
228. See Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1211 (10th Cir. 2009) ("Because we
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would have detrimental effects on important legislation, such as those
relating to zoning and trespass laws. Additionally, if the right to exclude
were considered a fundamental right where strict scrutiny would be
applied, then enforcement actions by government agencies would be
severely impeded if government actors were not allowed to enter some-
one's private property against the owner's wishes. For example, the
OSH Act includes a provision granting authority for agents of OSHA "to
enter, inspect, and investigate places of employment." '229 Without such
power, OSHA and other government entities are virtually unable to
enforce important laws that benefit society and protect the safety, health
and welfare of citizens. Although the current "Guns-At-Work" law
seems to be an unjustified excuse to abrogate the right to exclude, the
ramifications for classifying property as a fundamental right would be
far reaching and would interfere with crucial legislation.
While there is historical evidence that property rights were cher-
ished and viewed as an important right by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion, such evidence does not transform this treasured right into a
fundamental one for purposes of employing a heightened level of scru-
tiny. Nonetheless, evidence of the importance of property interests
should not have been completely ignored by the Florida Legislature.
Such evidence is exhibited in the Third,23 ° Fourth,231 Fifth,2 32 and Four-
teenth2 33 Amendments. Furthermore, historically, the right to vote,
which is a recognized fundamental right, was often closely associated
with the right to own property.234
Florida also has recognized that property rights have acquired a
special status in our society.235 The Florida Constitution specifically sin-
gles out property rights from other rights by providing that the right to
cannot say the [gun laws] have no reasonably conceivable rational basis, Plaintiffs' due process
claim must fail.").
229. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2006).
230. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
231. "The fight of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." Id. amend. IV.
232. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. amend. V.
233. Although the Fourteenth Amendment was added later in 1868, making the Due Process
Clause applicable to the states shows the continued recognition of the value placed on property
rights in the early part of United States' history. See id. amend. XIV.
234. POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 3-4 (2003)
("The link between property and liberty acquired additional importance in the early decades
following the Revolution because voting rights were often tied to property ownership. Although
voting fights are no longer dependent upon the amount of property the voter owns, it is common
today to view the protection of private property to be fundamental for the protection of other civil
rights.").
235. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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"acquire, possess, and protect property" are among those rights that are
inalienable.236 Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged
the sacredness of property rights in Corn v. State, when it expressed that
"[t]he right of property has been characterized as a sacred right, the pro-
tection of which is an important object of government. '237 The Corn
Court further recognized that the United States Supreme Court "empha-
sized the importance of the right to private property as basic to the foun-
dation of our democratic system of government in the following
language: 'The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to
require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred.' "238
Not only has the United States Supreme Court recognized that a
property owner's "right to exclude" someone or something from his
property is "universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right," '23 9 but the Florida Constitution and the Florida Supreme Court
have also demonstrated that property rights have historically played an
important role in our society, and continue to play such a role today. The
Florida "Guns-At-Work" law infringes upon the employer's right to
exclude unwanted guns from its property. Although this article does not
advocate the notion that property rights are fundamental rights; nonethe-
less the Florida Legislature should have considered the historical and
current significance of property before enacting a Statute that forces
property owners to store dangerous weapons on private property, includ-
ing private residential property, in the case of a home-based business. It
is unwise for a legislature to enact legislation that strips property owners
of such an important right for a purpose in which the justification
remains highly suspect.24° As demonstrated, property rights in this coun-
try are greatly valued, and the Florida Legislature failed to fairly balance
the interests of gun owners with those of property owners, and in failing
to do so, a treasured right has been trampled upon.
236. Id.
237. Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla. 1976).
238. Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1828)).
239. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
240. Although the ConocoPhillips court ultimately found that the challenged gun law
amendments passed the rational basis level of scrutiny, the court did concede that "[t]he Court has
serious concerns about these criminal laws, which deprive Oklahoma property owners of the right
to exclude those individuals carrying and transporting firearms in their vehicles .... Although it is
a close question, the Court cannot conclude the Amendments are wholly arbitrary or irrational
methods of promoting safety and deterring crime. It is not this Court's province to invalidate state
law because the Court disagrees with the Legislature's chosen method of achieving its objectives."
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1340 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (emphasis added),
rev'd sub nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
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VI. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF FLORIDA'S "GuN-AT-WORK" LAW:
Even though Florida's "Guns-At-Work" law has withstood consti-
tutional challenges, as currently written, the law is nonetheless unwise
and ill conceived, and has many problematic aspects to it. Furthermore,
the Statute is poorly drafted and leaves many questions unanswered.
First, even the Attorney General of Florida acknowledged to the Florida
Retail court that portions of the Statute are unclear and do not convey
what the Florida Legislature in fact intended.24" ' Due to the sloppy draft-
ing, the Statute "imposed limitations on a business's treatment of its
customers" only in the situation where at least one of the business's
workers has a concealed weapons permit.24 2 The Attorney General
admitted that "the statute should be applied to all businesses, not just to
businesses with at least one worker who has a concealed-carry per-
mit." '243 In recognizing the irrational outcome the poor drafting has pro-
duced, the Attorney General argued that "a court should rewrite a statute
to avoid an absurd result. '2" However, the Florida Retail court refused
to rewrite the Statute on behalf of the Legislature, and stated that "it is
not too much to ask the Legislature to say what it means, and it is not
to[o] much to ask a court to apply the statute as written." '245 Ultimately,
because of the irrational distinction that was unintentionally drawn
between businesses with an employee who possesses a concealed gun
permit, and businesses without an employee who possesses such a per-
mit, the Florida Retail court determined that the portion of the Statute
pertaining to customers was unconstitutional.246 As demonstrated, poor
drafting and confusing language has resulted in unintended conse-
quences. Unfortunately for employers in Florida, this was the only por-
tion of the Statute that was struck down, while the rest of the confusing
language remains for employers to sift through trying to understand the
true consequences of this law.
Not only is the Statute awkwardly drafted, but the Legislature's
word choice is also misleading. Although difficult to tell from the word-
ing of the Statute, there is no Second Amendment right to carry a gun on
private property against the will of the property owner. 247 As recognized
241. See Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (N.D. Fla.
2008).
242. Id. at 1300.
243. Id. at 1296.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1297.
246. Id. at 1300.
247. Id. at 1295 ("[A] private business's banning of guns on its own property plainly is not
unconstitutional; there is no constitutional right to bear arms on private property against the
owner's wishes.").
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by the Florida Retail court, the Second Amendment only applies against
the government and not against private individuals.248 Nonetheless, the
"Guns-At-Work" law specifies its purpose is
to codify the long-standing legislative policy of the state that individ-
ual citizens have a constitutional right to keep and bear arms, that
they have a constitutional right to possess and keep legally owned
firearms within their motor vehicles for self-defense and other lawful
purposes, and that these rights are not abrogated by virtue of a citi-
zen becoming a customer, employee, or invitee of a business
entity. 2 9
The Florida Legislature's reliance on the Second Amendment to justify
carrying guns on someone else's private property is severely misplaced.
The Florida Retail court acknowledged this when it stated that:
The entire substantive section of the guns-at-work statute,
§790.251(4), prohibits private businesses only from 'violat[ing] the
constitutional rights' of workers or customers in the specific respects
described in §790.251(4)(a) through (e)-that is, in the specific
respects addressed in this opinion. But a private business's banning
of guns on its own property plainly is not unconstitutional; there is
no constitutional right to bear arms on private property against the
owner's wishes.2 50
Calling the choice of wording used by the Florida Legislature "rhetorical
flourish," the Florida Retail court declared that "when the statute refers
to the 'constitutional' right to bear arms, it means the right to bear arms
created by [the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law] itself."' 25 ' It is evident that
the entire premise for the "Guns-At-Work" law is misunderstood by its
own drafters, and as can be expected, the law is confusing and mislead-
ing to its readers.
Furthermore, even the recent United States Supreme Court decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller does not add support to the argument
that the right to carry a gun in a car is protected by the Second Amend-
ment.252 In Heller, even though the Supreme Court found that a com
plete ban on handguns, even in a person's own home, was too restrictive
and was found to be unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, 53
the Supreme Court never discussed the right to carry a gun in one's car.
248. Id. ("[T]he constitutional right to bear arms restricts the actions of only the federal or state
governments.. .not private actors.").
249. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(3) (2009) (emphasis added).
250. Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1295 (emphasis added).
251. Id.
252. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787-88 (2008) ("We consider
whether a... prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second
Amendment to the Constitution.").
253. Id. at 2821-22.
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The Court simply did not address "whether the right of self-defense
extends to a person's car."'2 54 In any event, Heller involved a govern-
mental actor banning guns, and not an individual person, as is the case
here.
Even though property rights are not considered to be fundamental
for purposes of strict scrutiny, property rights nonetheless play a funda-
mental role in our society and were highly valued by the Framers of our
Constitution. Therefore, property rights should trump gun "rights" in
this situation, because the Second Amendment does not apply to private
actors. As recognized by the Supreme Court, the right to exclude is a
fundamental aspect of our property rights.155 By stripping a property
owner of his right to exclude unwanted persons and objects from his
property, the Florida Legislature is stripping him of a crucial right
acknowledged by the Supreme Court. The Second Amendment is not
applicable against private actors, and therefore, there is no constitutional
justification to force a property owner to allow guns on his property. 6
The Florida Legislature attempted to find constitutional support for the
law; however, no such justification exists.
The importance of property rights should have been recognized by
the Florida Legislature, but it was not, and the fact that the "Guns-At-
Work" law mentions in its stated purpose that it is codifying the "consti-
tutional" right to bear arms, only proves that the Legislature did not
recognize that a private individual may infringe upon another person's
"right" to bear arms. 725 From the wording of the Statute, it appears that
the Legislature intended to protect a constitutional "right" for gun own-
ers to carry guns on someone else's private property. However, in actu-
ality the legislature has created a new statutory right for gun owners,
rather than codify an existing constitutional right.
Although the Florida Retail court stated that the Legislature could
have had a rational basis to believe that guns in cars will actually
enhance the safety and welfare of citizens, statistics regarding workplace
violence and gun violence in general lead to the opposite conclusion.
258
Violence is even more likely during downsizing and layoffs,2 59 and now
that the U.S. economy is currently suffering dramatically and many
employees are losing their jobs, employers have even greater cause for
concern. Moreover, 5.3% of all employers have faced an incident of
254. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 35.
255. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
256. See, e.g., Fla. Retail, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
257. See, e.g., id.
258. See, e.g., Loomis et al., supra note 41.
259. Zimmerman, supra note 42.
[Vol. 64:663
FLORIDA'S "GUNS-AT- WORK" LAW
workplace violence. 260 An obvious problematic aspect of this law is that
employers have been stripped of an important method of preventing gun
violence on their premises. The "Guns-At-Work" law prohibits employ-
ers from inquiring into which employees have guns in their cars,2 6' so
employers have no way of knowing which employees pose a potentially
deadly threat, and can therefore do very little to protect other employees
and customers from potential injury. Even if an employer has a metal
detector inside the premises to detect when an employee is attempting to
bring a gun inside the workplace-which an employer may still do even
under the new law-the employer has no means of detecting guns in
cars, because searching a car262 or even inquiring is strictly prohib-
ited. 63 Therefore, there appears to be no possible method of preventing
gun violence from occurring in the parking lot itself.
The Statute also creates a new protected class of employees.2 "
Employers are now prohibited from conditioning employment on
whether a potential employee holds a concealed weapons license or
upon an employee agreeing not to keep a gun inside his car.265 Addition-
ally, an employee may not be terminated or discriminated against for
"exercising his or her constitutional right to bear arms. 2 66 Providing
such protection to employees who are gun owners may lead to increased
wrongful termination suits. Furthermore, adding such a protected class
trivializes the importance of the other recognized protected classes of
employees.267 Not being able to condition employment and not being
able to terminate an employee for the reasons listed in the Statute inter-
feres with Florida's at-will employment doctrine, and creates an excep-
tion to it.268 Finally, the "Guns-At-Work" law provides that employers
will not be liable "in a civil action based on actions or inactions taken in
compliance with [the "Guns-At-Work" law] . '269 Therefore, if an
employee with a lawful firearm properly stored in his vehicle does injure
or kill someone, it appears that the employer will be protected from civil
liability. The result of this is that the only recourse an injured employee
260. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 36, tbl. 1.
261. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(b) (2009).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See Salcedo, supra note 190.
265. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(c).
266. Id. § 790.251(4)(e).
267. See, e.g., Schoultz, supra note 4.
268. See, e.g., Bruley v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1386 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
("[The Guns-At-Work law] creates an exception to at-will employment to prevent an employer
from firing an employee for possessing a firearm in the employee's car while on company
property." (emphasis omitted)).
269. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(5)(b).
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has with respect to monetary compensation, other than suing the aggres-
sor, will be to file a Worker's Compensation claim. Assuming the partic-
ular situation is covered by Worker's Compensation, even though the
employer is not being sued himself, the end result is that the employer's
Worker's Compensation rates may increase due to any injuries that may
occur as a result of this new law.
Realistically, Worker's Compensation will not apply to every event
of workplace violence. In order to be eligible for Worker's Compensa-
tion benefits in Florida, an employee must "suffe[r] an accidental com-
pensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and
the scope of employment. 27° The question then becomes whether all
cases of workplace violence would be considered to be "arising out of"
employment. Is a personal dispute in the company parking lot that turns
violent covered? If not, employees now have virtually no monetary
recourse for injuries or death caused by gun violence on company prop-
erty, other than attempting to collect from the aggressor. What also
remains unclear is if the employer would be liable if a person without a
license to carry a concealed weapon injured or killed someone. The law
refers only to a gun that is lawfully owned and locked in a vehicle.271 A
big gap in immunity coverage seems to exist if employers are not pro-
vided with protection from suits for an act of violence that resulted in
injury or death due to the use of an unlawfully owned gun or from a gun
that was not properly locked inside the vehicle. If such protection is not
provided, then employers face potential negligence and tort actions that
they are unable to prevent because they have no lawful means of search-
ing for illegal weapons or improperly stored weapons, nor are they per-
mitted to even make an inquiry. 72 It seems illogical that the Legislature
actually intended to impose such harsh consequences on employers for
simply following the law. However, as written, the law seems to create
such absurd results.
An even larger gap in immunity coverage exists regarding criminal
liability. The Statute only provides for immunity from civil action, 73 but
contains no mention of immunity from criminal liability. 274 Therefore, it
appears that an employer could still be held criminally liable in those
extreme circumstances where criminal charges are brought against an
employer after a violent episode results in death.275 Although these cru-
270. Id. § 440.09(1) (emphasis added).
271. See, e.g., id. § 790.251(4)(a)-(c).
272. Id. § 790.25] (4)(b).
273. Id. § 790.251(5)(b).
274. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(e) (2009) (providing employers with civil as well
as criminal immunity under Georgia's comparable "Guns-At-work" law).
275. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2006) (The OSH Act provides that: "Any employer who
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cial questions remain unanswered regarding the extent of the immunity
the law provides to employers, nonetheless, the NRA twists the "Guns-
At-Work" law so that it appears to actually benefit employers, because
now employers have civil immunity whereas before they did not have
such protection.276
Although it may be true that those who are unlawfully carrying
guns would do so whether or not their employer has a policy banning it,
the new law only complicates matters further, as it now creates an addi-
tional hardship for the employer by not allowing the employer to even
inquire as to whom has a gun, as well as preventing the employer from
searching vehicles.2 77 Furthermore, instituting a "no guns" policy can be
an effective method for terminating a potentially dangerous employee
who violates the policy by bringing a gun to work.278 Although not
intended by the Legislature, the end result is that unlawfully carried guns
and other dangerous weapons are now just as protected as lawfully car-
ried guns. Not being able to inquire or to search vehicles, in essence,
provides statutory protection for all employees, even if the employee is
harboring an illegal weapon.
Even if employers are immune from civil lawsuits because of the
"Guns-At-Work" law; nonetheless, employers could incur other finan-
cial costs. A violent episode not only places a financial burden on a
business, but also has significant emotional effects as well.27 9 Physical
damage to the premises caused by violence in the workplace can be
costly. Either the employer pays out-of-pocket or its insurance company
pays to repair such damage. However, in the event that the insurance
willfully violates any standard, rule, or order promulgated pursuant to section 655 of this title, or
of any regulations prescribed pursuant to this chapter, and that violation caused death to any
employee, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both; except that if the conviction is for a
violation committed after a first conviction of such person, punishment shall be by a fine of not
more than $20,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.").
276. Letter from Marion P. Hammer, USF Executive Dir., United Sportsmen of Fla., to USF &
NRA Members and Friends (July 1, 2008), http://www.nraila.org/legislation/read.aspx?ID=4060
("[The new law] provide[s] new benefits for businesses. Yesterday, business owners had no
immunity from liability if a firearm stored in a vehicle in its parking lot was used to cause harm on
its property. Today, they do have immunity.").
277. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(b).
278. Society for Human Resource Management's, et al. Brief as Amici Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla.,
576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (No. 4:08-cv-00179-RH-WCS).
279. See JoAnn M. Sullivan, 2004 Workplace Violence Survey & White Paper May 2004, RM/
INSIGHT (Am. Soc'y of Safety Engineers, Des Plaines, Ill.), Spring 2004, at 1, available at http://
www.asse.org/newsroom/releases/press394_survey.pdf. ("Workplace violence incidents take more
than a financial toll. Employees witnessing violent acts in the workplace report increased level of
stress and lower morale, which may lead to decreased productivity and increased absenteeism and
turnover.").
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company will cover the costs of the repairs, the employer faces a possi-
ble increase in its insurance rates; therefore, ultimately the employer will
feel a financial effect in either scenario. An even more severe conse-
quence would be if the insurance company cancelled the employer's pol-
icy, making it more difficult and more expensive to obtain other
insurance, if possible at all. According to the Center to Prevent Handgun
Violence, "[i]nsurance companies have already foreseen the increased
risks of violence posed by having firearms on business premises, and
some have threatened to cancel policies unless firearms are prohib-
ited."28 Furthermore, after employees are exposed to such violence,
professional trauma or grief counseling may be necessary which is an
additional financial expense.
Even with immunity from civil suit, no employer wants to deal
with the multitude of consequences that violence in the workplace
causes.28' Productivity will clearly be affected by any violent inci-
dent.282 Emotionally distraught employees will simply not be as produc-
tive.283 Additionally, absenteeism has been shown to increase after a
violent incident.284 Not only will the employees who were physically
injured due to the violence be absent from work, but those employees
psychologically injured from the episode may also be absent. The addi-
tional medical expenses may cause the employer's group health insur-
ance rates to rise as well. Immunity from civil suit is far from being a
perfect solution and will do very little to ameliorate the strong detrimen-
tal impact the "Guns-At-Work" law will have on businesses. Perhaps the
FBI best summed up the effects of workplace violence when it wrote
that:
Clearly violence in the workplace affects society as a whole. The
economic cost, difficult to measure with any precision, is certainly
substantial. There are intangible costs too. Like all violent crime,
workplace violence creates ripples that go beyond what is done to a
particular victim. It damages trust, community, and the sense of
security every worker has a right to feel while on the job. In that
sense, everyone loses when a violent act takes place, and everyone
280. CTR. TO PREvENT HANDGUN VIOLENCE, GUNS & BUSINESS DON'T Mix: A GUIDE TO
KEEPING YOUR BUSINESS GUN-FREE 21-22, (1997), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/
xshare/pdf/reports/gunsnbusiness.pdf.
281. "Employers have a legal and ethical obligation to promote a work environment free from
threats and violence and, in addition, can face economic loss as the result of violence in the form
of lost work time, damaged employee morale and productivity, increased workers' compensation
payments, medical expenses, and possible lawsuits and liability costs." See FBI, DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE 15 (Eugene A. Rugala ed. 2004), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/violence.pdf.
282. See Sullivan, supra note 280.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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has a stake in efforts to stop violence from happening.285
VII. AMENDMENT RECOMMENDATIONS:
Despite the strong opposition, it appears that, at least for the time
being, the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law is here to stay because no
appeal has been filed from the ruling in Florida Retail Federation, Inc.
v. Attorney General of Florida. However, portions of the Statute are
poorly drafted and ill-conceived. Therefore, amendments to the Statute
should be considered. This article proposes a variety of amendments that
would add clarity and also help resolve the safety conflicts that employ-
ers are facing in complying with the "Guns-At-Work" law. Furthermore,
as contemplated by this article, there are situations in which an
employer's obligations under the General Duty Clause of the OSH Act
may be in direct conflict with the "Guns-At-Work" law. In order to sur-
vive a preemption challenge in such situations, this article recommends
that changes be made to the "Guns-At-Work" law, in order for both sets
of laws to coexist.
The most basic of the proposed amendments is for the Florida Leg-
islature to clarify the unclear portions of the Statute and write what it
actually intended.286 For example, employers are entitled to know the
extent to which the law provides them with immunity, which under the
current law is unclear and possibly misleading. From the wording of the
Statute, it appears that employers are only provided with civil immunity
for injury or death resulting from those guns that are lawfully owned and
stored. If this is the case, then the Legislature has not provided much
immunity at all, and employers need to be aware of this so that they are
not lulled into a false sense of security. On the other hand, if the Legisla-
ture actually intended to provide full immunity to employers, even for
injuries occurring from the use of the unlawful guns and other weapons
that were stored in a vehicle in the company parking lot, then the Statute
should be amended to reflect the Legislature's true intent. This is espe-
cially critical so that law enforcement and the judiciary have a clear
understanding of the extent of the immunity coverage in order to enforce
the law properly as well as to adjudicate any potential litigation under
the proper framework. Other states with similar gun laws have provided
much more clarity as to the extent of immunity provided under the law.
For example, Georgia's law specifies that an employer will be immune
from criminal and civil liability even for injuries or death arising from
285. FBI, supra note 282, at 14-15.
286. See, e.g., Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284
(N.D. Fla. 2008) (explaining that the Attorney General of Florida acknowledged that portions of
the statute contain drafting errors and do not say what the Florida Legislature in fact intended).
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the use of a gun that was stolen from an employee's car.287 In addition to
clarity, another recommendation, which may seem drastic, is to allow
employers to have a separate parking area for gun carriers. This is obvi-
ously contrary to many portions of the Statute because that would result
in an employer knowing who carries a gun. However, this would help
accomplish the main goals on both sides of this controversy. In fact,
other states with similar gun laws have explicitly exempted compliance
with such laws for those employers who provide separate parking lots.
For example, Louisiana has explicitly stated that its statute does not
apply to:
Any vehicle on property controlled by a. .. private employer ... if
access is restricted or limited through the use of a fence, gate, secur-
ity station, signage, or other means of restricting or limiting general
public access onto the parking area, and ... [t]he employer provides
an alternative parking area reasonably close to the main parking area
in which employees and other persons may transport or store firearms
in locked, privately-owned motor vehicles.288
Georgia also has carved out a similar exception, specifically exempting
employers who provide a separate and secure parking lot from portions
of the statute. 289
Because it is relatively unrealistic to believe having guns in a com-
pany parking lot enhances safety,29° the strongest argument for the pro-
ponents of the Statute is that some employees might want to have their
guns in their cars for general protection and should not have to leave
their guns at home because they are prohibited from parking in the com-
pany lot with a gun in the car. They might need to use their guns for
protection on their way driving to work or going home from work, and
with such a ban, their guns would be unavailable if needed for self-
defense during their commute. However, creating separate parking lots
allows the employee to store his gun in his car, while the employer
knows where the potential danger to its business and employees could
287. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(e) (2009) ("No employer.., shall be held liable in any
criminal or civil action for damages resulting from or arising out of an occurrence involving the
transportation, storage, possession, or use of a firearm, including, but not limited to, the theft of a
firearm from an employee's automobile.").
288. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1(D)(3)(b) (2008).
289. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(d)(1) (stating that the portions of the statute relating to the
prohibition of searching employee vehicles and the prohibition of conditioning employment upon
an employee's agreement not to enter the parking lot with a gun, do not apply to "an employer
providing applicable employees with a secure parking area which restricts general public access
through the use of a gate, security station, security officers, or other similar means which limit
public access into the parking area, provided that any employer policy allowing vehicle searches
upon entry shall be applicable to all vehicles entering the property and applied on a uniform and
frequent basis").
290. See, e.g., Loomis et al., supra note 41.
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come from and can take the necessary protective measures, such as fenc-
ing in that area to make guarding those cars with guns inside more effi-
cient. Security guards may be needed to oversee that the gun owner does
not retrieve the gun from his car, other than for self-defense. A gun in a
parked car not only creates the possibility of a disgruntled employee
retrieving his own gun from his car, but also increases the risk of gun
violence occurring due to a break-in to the vehicle in the company park-
ing lot, resulting in the stolen gun being used to injure or kill others in
the vicinity. This may prove to be a very realistic scenario considering
that the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence has reported that 28%
of guns that had been reported stolen were retrieved from parked cars.29 1
Therefore, creating a barrier cutting off access to the general public
would help prevent thieves from breaking into cars and stealing guns
stored inside, containing a potentially dangerous situation.292
Although conditioning employment or terminating an employee
based on gun ownership could still be prohibited under the Statute, an
employer should be allowed to inquire as to which employees store guns
in their cars, in order to better protect the workplace. This may require a
complete redrafting of the Statute, since key provisions would have to be
stricken. Despite the tremendous safety benefits this amendment may
provide, opponents to such an amendment could express concern that
"open" gun owners would be targets for discrimination. Nevertheless, in
adopting this amendment, the Florida Legislature would be more fairly
balancing the interests of both sides of the controversy while still pro-
viding protection to each side.
Another important recommendation relates to the consequences of
an employee who brings a gun to work and fails to comply with the
requirements for protection under the Statute. Although an employee
who exhibits a gun for non self-defense purposes is not protected by the
Statute, 93 the consequences of doing so are unclear. Instead of limiting
strict penalties to an employer who fails to comply with the law, this
article recommends that strict penalties should be imposed on an
employee who fails to comply as well. Rather than just being able to fire
the employee for removing the gun from the car, the gun owner should
be considered to be trespassing under the law. The same should apply to
those employees who have illegally owned guns stored in their cars.
Perhaps criminal and civil penalties will deter gun owners from exhibit-
ing their stored guns, therefore reducing the chance of an accidental or
intentional shooting. An employer, who wishes to prohibit guns in the
291. See, e.g., Brady Campaign To Prevent Gun Violence, supra note 39.
292. See, e.g., id.
293. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(4)(e) (2009).
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workplace, should still post a warning sign to employees indicating that
firearms are prohibited on all company property, except as provided by
law. Therefore, if an employee is not protected under the Statute, then
such an employee has violated the employer's policy and could not only
be fired, but could also be considered a trespasser. Harsh consequences
are a necessary component that is currently absent from the "Guns-At-
Work" law and could help ensure that the gun remains properly locked
inside the vehicle.
Finally, when enacting the "Guns-At-Work" law, it appears that the
Florida Legislature failed to consider the millions of businesses that
operate out of private homes,2 94 and did not provide an exemption for
employers whose offices are located in their own homes. The Legisla-
ture's complete disregard of the sanctity of one's own home is very
alarming. As a result of the "Guns-At-Work" law, a home-based
employer may have small children in his home, and still may not ban
guns from employee vehicles parked on his own drive-way. The Legis-
lature has already exempted schools from complying with the "Guns-At-
Work" law, 95 which demonstrates that the Legislature is aware of a
special need to protect children from firearms. In order to protect chil-
dren and the sanctity of an employer's private residential home, an
amendment should be added to exempt a business that is operated out of
a residential home. Instinctively, many would acknowledge a distinction
between commercial property interests and residential property interests.
If a line must be drawn with regard to private property rights, it should
be drawn at the home. It seems grossly contrary to the Framers' inten-
tions for the state to prohibit an employer from banning dangerous
weapons from a person's private residential property.
This article has outlined the various negative implications that arise
from the "Guns-At-Work" law. In addition to those amendments that
would provide added safety measures to the workplace, another amend-
ment that should be considered is one that would relieve employers who
are caught in the so-called catch-22 situation from being forced to
choose between complying with the state law and the federal law. Other
states with similar gun laws have included an exemption in order to
comply with federal law. For example, a similar gun law in Georgia
specifically provides a resolution to a potential conflict between federal
law and the state gun law by providing the following provision:
294. Nearly half of the 16.7 million business owners who responded to the Survey of Business
Owners collected by the Small Business Administration ran a home-based business, of which
22.1% employed at least one employee. See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY OF THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESs
ADMIN., THE SMALL Busass EcONOMY: A REPORT TO THE PREsiDETr 81, 83 (2007), available
at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/sbecon2007.pdf.
295. FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(a).
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In any action relating to the enforcement of any right or obligation
under this Code section, an employer, property owner, or property
owner's agent's efforts to comply with other applicable federal, state,
or local safety laws, regulations, guidelines, or ordinances shall be a
complete defense to any employer, property owner, or property
owner's agent's liability.2 96
In other words, Georgia provides employers with a defense for non-
compliance with the state law resulting from compliance with a conflict-
ing law. Under the Georgia statute, an employer whose workplace is
prone to workplace violence to the extent that it becomes a "recognized
hazard," 297 and puts forth "efforts" 298 to comply with the General Duty
Clause by banning guns, then such efforts would be a defense to any
liability for noncompliance with the Georgia gun law. In addition to pro-
viding employers with this logical defense, this provision also protects
the Georgia law from being preempted by the General Duty Clause in
the event of an actual conflict. In essence, the Georgia law provides that
a conflict with federal law is an exemption from compliance with the
state gun law. With this clever exemption, an employer in Georgia, in
whose workplace violence is a recognized hazard, is not caught in the
same catch-22 situation as is an employer in Florida. This not only helps
employers, but also leaves the Georgia law in a less vulnerable position
from being preempted if an actual conflict were to arise between the
General Duty Clause and the gun law. Such a provision reconciles a
potential conflict with the OSH Act, while at the same time it is also a
way to avoid conflict preemption. If the Florida Legislature amends the
Statute to include such an exemption, then not only does the law allevi-
ate the employer's simultaneous compliance dilemma, but such an
exemption would also save the Statute from preemption under the Gen-
eral Duty Clause. There would no longer be an issue of conflict preemp-
tion if the state law voluntarily yielded to the federal law in those
situations where the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law is in conflict with an
employer's obligations under the General Duty Clause.2 9
CONCLUSION:
The recommended amendments are not perfect, but they provide
employers with an added safety mechanism which may not only prevent
workplace violence, but may also protect the employer from an OSHA
296. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(f) (2009) (emphasis added).
297. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006).
298. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135(f).
299. For example, where an employer is cited by OSHA for workplace violence and would
then be required to abate the hazard. Banning guns from the workplace would be a feasible
method of abating such a hazard.
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citation. Additionally, having a separate parking area allows gun owners
to store guns in their vehicles, while at the same time recognizes the
right to exclude from the remainder of the employer's commercial prop-
erty. Providing an exemption to home-based businesses restores the
home owner's right to exclude and is also a means of protecting children
just as the school exemption provides protection. The Florida Legisla-
ture has already recognized such a need,30 and therefore, extending the
protection to homes, where children are commonly found, is not a dra-
matic step. Finally, providing an exemption in order to comply with fed-
eral law not only protects an employer caught in a catch-22 situation, but
also saves the "Guns-At-Work" law from possible pre-emption in those
situations contemplated in this article.
Regardless of any constitutional arguments, property rights have
been recognized to be of utmost importance. Therefore, from a policy
perspective, the Florida Legislature, even if not constitutionally
required, should be very cautious when depriving property owners of a
critical aspect of property ownership-the right to exclude. In enacting
the "Guns-At-Work" law, the Legislature failed to strike a fair and logi-
cal balance between respecting private property interests and strengthen-
ing gun "rights." Such failure is unwise and results in dangerous
consequences. The "Guns-At-Work" law needs further clarification from
the Legislature to answer the many questions that have been raised in
this article.
If the law is left to stand as it is currently written, inevitably, unin-
tended results will occur. As demonstrated by the Florida Retail court's
ruling, the unintentional distinction drawn between businesses resulted
in the portions of the law relating to customers being found unconstitu-
tional.30 1 The Legislature was sloppy in its drafting, and the employers
of Florida are left with a law that has a significant number of unan-
swered questions, which may result in civil and possibly criminal liabil-
ity for employers. Furthermore, although the Florida Retail court found
the portions of the law relating to employees to be constitutional, 30 2 the
ConocoPhillips court found that a similar law was pre-empted by the
OSH Act under the Supremacy Clause. 303 Although the Tenth Circuit
ultimately reversed the ConocoPhillips court's decision on this issue, 3°4
the ConocoPhillips case, nevertheless, shows that this issue is not clear
300. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251(7)(a).
301. Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1300 (N.D. Fla.
2008).
302. Id.
303. ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1340 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev'd sub
nom. Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
304. See Ramsey, 555 F.3d at 1208.
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cut, and the Tenth Circuit's ruling may not be the final decision on this
issue. As demonstrated in this article, not only is the "Guns-At-Work"
law capable of being pre-empted in specific situations, but it also places
employers in a catch-22 situation-obey the law and risk an occurrence
of workplace violence and possibly a citation and penalties from
OSHA-or disobey the law and risk a suit brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral of Florida or the aggrieved employee.305 Florida employers are
caught in a no-win situation and are left to choose between the lesser of
two "evils."
It may appear that the Florida "Guns-At-Work" law has prevailed
because the outcome of Florida Retail Federation, Inc. v. Attorney Gen-
eral of Florida has not been appealed. However, a declaration of victory
is premature, and the future of the "Guns-At-Work" law remains to be
seen. The Attorney General of Florida has yet to bring an action against
an employer for failure to comply with the law. However, in the future,
if an action is brought against an employer for violating the "Guns-At-
Work" law or an employer is cited under the General Duty Clause due to
compliance with the "Guns-At-Work" law, the employer could bring an
as-applied constitutional challenge. Therefore, even though the Florida
Retail decision has not been appealed, nonetheless, the "Guns-At-Work"
law that the NRA plans to spread throughout the United States,306 is a
contentious issue that could eventually appear before the United States
Supreme Court. This article advocates for legislative reform for pre-
cisely the reasons discussed. For now, the political process may be the
only means for inducing the Florida Legislature to recognize the extreme
detrimental effects of the "Guns-At-Work" law and to amend the law
appropriately to better reflect a fair and logical compromise between the
interests of employers and gun owners.
305. See FLA. STAT. § 790.251(6).
306. See, e.g., Schoultz supra note 4.
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